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Preface
This Ph.D. thesis consists of three research papers which are the result of my studies
at the Lombardy Advanced School of Economic Research, University of Milan. Part of
this work was accomplished during my visiting period at the Market Operations Analysis
division at the European Central Bank.
The three papers, each one contained in a separate chapter, are linked by one common
subject: the Credit Default Swaps (CDSs), and the consequences that their trading has,
in broad terms, on the financial system.
This preface introduces the content of the three chapters and briefly explains how the
research questions have been addressed.
A CDS is a derivative on the credit risk of a reference entity which, similarly to an
insurance contract, enables the transfer of risk from one subject to another. As such, the
main benefit is that a CDS allows to hedge credit risk exposure. Simultaneously, it also
opens the possibility to speculate on the credit risk of financial, corporate or sovereign
entities. Actually, CDSs are not regulated as insurance instruments. The possibility of
buying uncovered CDSs is one of the reasons which contributed to the exponential growth
of the market in the first half of the last decade. As a matter of fact, just before the onset
of the global financial crisis in 2007, the CDS market reached the peak of approximately
USD 58 trillion. This contributed in raising concerns on the potential destabilising role of
such derivatives; additionally, speculation in CDSs has been blamed to be one of the root
causes of the global financial crisis by both policy makers and popular press. A heated
debate on welfare implications of trading in CDSs has accordingly risen in academia.
The final objective of this work is to contribute to this debate, and to shed light on the
potential negative consequences that speculation in CDSs may have on financial stability.
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The first chapter of this thesis provides an introduction to the topic and surveys some
segments of the rapidly growing literature on CDSs. Specifically, after discussing the
features of CDSs and the relative welfare implications, it reviews: (i) some theoretical
studies about CDS pricing, (ii) empirical literature exploring the determinants of CDS
spreads, and (iii) papers which study the relationship between CDSs and underlying
bonds. The aim of the first chapter is twofold: to highlight gaps in the existing liter-
ature, and to identify room for further research. In this context, we identify three main
existing gaps which underpin the studies presented in Chapters 2 and 3.
The second chapter analyses the mechanism of price discovery between banks’ CDSs
and underlying bonds, also to assess the impact that the leading role of the CDS market
has on the determinants of bank’s credit risk. As highlighted in Chapter 1, existing literat-
ure on this topic concentrates mainly on CDSs written on corporate or sovereign entities,
resulting in a lack of analysis on the financial sector. The study in Chapter 2 aims to close
this gap by focusing on CDS-bond price discovery process for 32 European banks.
In theory, the CDS-bond price discovery should first happen on the bond market, and
arbitrage relationship should keep bond and CDS spreads at par. However, as in practice
the bond-CDS basis is not equal to zero, this mechanism may be reversed, resulting in a
leading role of the CDS market in price discovery process. This aspect assumes critical
importance as speculation on the derivative market may affect the refinancing cost of a
targeted entity.
The first result of Chapter 2 shows that, for a sub-sample of banks, the CDS market
leads the price discovery process. In order to further explore the implications of such
findings, a second analysis empirically decomposes banks’ CDS spreads variation ac-
cording to various credit risk drivers. It is shown that, for those banks for which CDSs
lead bonds, there exists a significantly stronger impact of the home country’s sovereign
risk on banks’ credit default swaps. One innovative aspect of this second analysis is that
we make use of confidential data obtained during my visiting at the European Central
Bank.
Another gap in the existing literature identified in Chapter 1 is the lack of studies
which evaluate the role of CDSs in the context of portfolio optimization. The last chapter
aims to bridge this gap.
Specifically, the study in Chapter 3, which is jointly written with Francesco Menoncin
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and forthcoming on the Journal of Financial Services Research, derives a closed-form
solution to the optimal investment problem for an agent maximising the expected utility
of his or her final wealth. It is assumed that the agent can invest in a frictionless and
complete financial market where a riskless asset, a defaultable bond, and a CDS written
on the bond are listed. The model is calibrated to market data of six European countries.
Thus, the investment strategy can be considered that of a financial institution which can
sell or buy credit risk protection on a sovereign entity.
The results of the numerical analysis show that the investor always speculates on
the credit risk of the reference entity by optimally short selling (or issuing) CDSs in a
quantity which is larger, in absolute value, than that of bonds optimally purchased. The
magnitude of this speculative strategy is positively linked to the risk of the underlying
sovereign entity.
The three chapters, although not being conclusive on the potential destabilising role
of CDSs, highlight existing weaknesses that may pose threats to the stability of financial
markets. Further research is needed to assess the deep implications of credit default
swaps trading on financial markets.
Giuseppe Ambrosini
Milan, November 2016
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Chapter 1
Credit default swaps: a literature survey
GIUSEPPE AMBROSINI ∗
Abstract
Since the issuance of the first credit default swap (CDS) contract in 1994, trading volume in CDS
has been growing exponentially, transforming a niche market into a multi-trillion-dollar market. The
subprime crisis in the US and the sovereign crisis in the EU contributed to raise concerns on the
potential destabilising role of such an instrument. Thus, also the academic literature started to hotly
debate the benefits and costs that trading in CDSs has on both the financial market and the real
economy. The aim of this study is to review some segments of the literature on CDSs, and to identify
existing gaps and room for further research. After discussing the features of CDSs and the relative
welfare implications, we survey theoretical studies which model CDS pricing, empirical literature
exploring the determinants of CDS spreads, and papers which study the relationship between CDSs
and their underlying assets.
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Chapter 1. Credit default swaps: a literature survey
1.1 Introduction
A credit default swap (CDS) is a derivative contract on credit risk which, similarly to
insurance, allows the transfer of the default risk of a reference entity from one subject (the
so-called “protection buyer”) to another (the so-called “protection seller”). The first CDS
contract was developed in late 1994 by J.P. Morgan and since then the market experienced
an enormous growth, reaching the peak of approximately USD 58 trillion in 2007.
The sub-prime crisis in the US and the sovereign crisis in the EU have focused the
world’s attention on CDSs. The exponential growth of the market, together with its opa-
city and its low level of regulation, contributed in raising concerns about the destabilising
effects of CDS trading on the economy. It has been often argued that speculation in credit
risk has exacerbated the effects of the crisis. As a result, in recent years, a number of cri-
tiques and calls for a more effective regulation of the CDS market have been made from
both popular press and policy makers.
Similarly to any other type of financial derivatives, credit default swaps have both
social benefits and social costs for the overall economy. On the one hand, they allow
investors to take short positions on credit risk, improving diversification, and facilitating
the hedging of credit exposures. On the other hand, it is often argued that they can
give rise to market manipulations and are potentially destabilizing because of the high
leverage they pose.
Also in the academic literature credit default swaps became a very hot and contro-
versial topic. Research in CDS was initially focused in modelling the price of such
instruments and it has rapidly expanded into a wide research field in financial economics.
As pointed out by Augustin et al. (2016), at the end of 2015, over more than one thou-
sand working papers posted on the Social Science Research Network are directly related
to the economic role of CDSs, or involve CDSs as a research tool. This large number
reflects the different findings and often asymmetrical conclusions of existing studies. On
the one hand it is argued that credit default swap trading implies more efficient risk shar-
ing and better pricing of credit risk (Duffee and Zhou, 2001; Ashcraft and Santos, 2009;
Thompson, 2010), more efficient risk management and capital allocation (Stulz, 2010;
Norden et al., 2014), lower borrowing costs and better liquidity in the market (Massa and
Zhang, 2012; Salomao, 2015). While on the other hand, it has been shown that trad-
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ing in CDSs reduce monitoring incentives for banks (Parlour and Winton, 2013; Arping,
2014), pose moral hazard and create adverse selection (Duffee and Zhou, 2001; Bolton
and Oehmke, 2011), increase counterparty, systemic and contagion risks (Allen and Car-
letti, 2006; Delatte et al., 2012; Stephens and Thompson, 2014; Chiarella et al., 2015;
Fostel et al., 2015).
This study assesses the state-of-the-art of existing literature in credit default swaps.
We aim to highlight some contradictions and weaknesses arising from existing studies,
to identify existing gaps and room for potential improvements.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the defin-
ition of credit default swap, the features of the market and the implication on welfare.
Section 1.3 surveys the theoretical literature which models CDS pricing. Section 1.4 ana-
lyses the literature which empirically studies the determinants of CDS spreads. Section
1.5 focuses on the studies which explore the relationship between CDS and underlying
bond. Finally, Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Overview of credit default swaps
1.2.1 Definition and features
A credit default swap is a bilateral derivative contract on the credit risk of a reference
entity. Functionally, a CDS is equivalent to an insurance contract: an investor (i.e. the
protection buyer) can transfer the credit risk associated with the reference entity (e.g. a
corporation, a bank, or a Government) to another investor (i.e. the protection seller) by
paying a periodic premium, called CDS spread. In the case the reference entity fails to
meet its obligations before the maturity of the CDS, the protection seller is then obliged to
pay a given notional amount to the buyer of protection. More specifically, a CDS agree-
ment usually includes information about a specific class of the reference entity’s capital
structure, references to a particular amount of insured debt, and defines the features of
the periodic payments.
The failure of the reference entity to pay its obligations is one of the credit events
that trigger the payments of the notional amount; other events are bankruptcy, obligation
default, acceleration, repudiation and restructuring. Generally, the occurrence of a credit
3
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event must be documented by public notice. The contract may specify the form of settle-
ment, which can be either cash or physical. In the first case, the payment following the
credit event has to be equal to the difference between the notional amount insured and the
recovery rate upon default (i.e. the loss given default, LGD). Instead, when the contract
specifies that the settlement of insurance is to be made in physical form, the payment
to the protection buyer equals the face value of the underlying bond; in exchange, the
claimant must transfer the reference obligation specified in the contractual agreement to
the protection seller.
Credit default swaps, or more generally credit derivatives, emerged in response to two
long-standing problems in banking: diversification and hedging of credit risk. Before the
introduction of credit derivatives, hedging credit risk was seldom feasible, as shorting
bonds requires the seller to borrow the asset, and diversification was practically difficult
to achieve, as the statistical properties of credit risk requires, for achieving an efficiently
diversified loan portfolio, a number of entities significantly larger than an equity or bond
portfolio.
CDSs provide solutions to both problems: (i) they allow investors to take a short
position on credit risk, without having to seek consent of the reference entity, and (ii)
they can reduce, or set to zero, lenders’ exposure to certain entities, thus improving their
credit portfolio diversification. As a consequence, CDSs facilitate risk sharing and allow
market participants to price credit risk more accurately, by both increasing liquidity in
the economy and reducing frictions in the credit market (Ashcraft and Santos, 2009).
Beside these benefits, like any derivative instrument, credit default swaps carry also
some costs for the economy. One main feature of CDSs is that they are traded over-the-
counter (OTC) and, consequently, their market is opaque and may allow for market dis-
tortions and manipulations. Furthermore, CDSs are not regulated as insurance contracts
and, consequently, investors can take short positions in credit default swaps, without
owning the underlying bonds the derivative is written on. As discussed in the next sub-
sections, these features of CDSs raised a number of critiques, calling for a more effective
regulation on the market from both academic literature and press.
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1.2.2 Market structure and evolution
CDSs are a relatively recent financial innovation. As described in Tett (2009), the first
CDS was issued in late 1994 by J.P. Morgan. The author describes how, in June 1994,
Exxon needed a USD 4.8 billion loan to cover potential damages resulting from the 1989
Exxon Valdez oil spill. J.P. Morgan was reluctant in turning down the oil company;
however, a USD 4.8 billion loan to Exxon would have tied up significant reserves of the
bank to provide for the risk of the loans. To overcome this issue, J.P. Morgan developed
a way to transfer the credit risk associated with the loan to a third party: they granted the
credit line to Exxon and sold to the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
(EBRD) the credit risk associated with the loan. EBRD took on the risk that Exxon might
go into default and, in exchange, J.P. Morgan paid the EBRD a fee on a yearly basis.
The International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) has played a significant
role in the development of the CDS market since its inception, by providing guidance
on the legal and institutional details of CDS contracts and by deliberating over issues in-
volving credit events, CDS auctions and other related matters. In 2002, ISDA updated its
Master Agreement,1 which provides OTC counterparties with standardized contracts, and
includes certain legal and credit provisions as a basis for negotiating credit derivatives.
In 2003, the Association published the Credit Derivatives Definitions, which was revised
and updated in 2014,2 and provides further guidance for credit derivative agreements.
Since the first CDS contract, and up to the onset of the financial crisis, the market has
been experiencing an exponential growth. The Bank of International Settlements (BIS)
undertakes semi-annual voluntary surveys on CDSs, covering the major dealers within
the G10 countries and Switzerland. The BIS periodically publishes the survey results,
including the notional amount outstanding and gross market values for traded CDSs. As
can be seen from Figure 1.1, from the end of 2005 to the onset of the financial crisis
in 2007, the total gross notional of CDSs outstanding experienced a three-digit growth
rates, reaching a peak of approximately USD 58 trillion.
The size of the CDS market dropped considerably after the 2007-08 crisis, in par-
ticular after the Lehman Brothers’ default. At the end of June 2015, the gross notional
1See http://www.isda.org/publications/isdamasteragrmnt.aspx
2See http://www2.isda.org/asset-classes/credit-derivatives/2014-isda-credit-derivatives-definitions/
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amount was close to USD 15 trillion. Major determinants of the drop of CDS market size
have been regulators’ concerns about central clearing and counterparty risk, which led to
significant portfolio compressions.
Gross notional amounts outstanding provide a measure of market size. However,
such amounts are not those truly at risk. A more accurate measure of the scale of credit
risk transfer in the market can be obtained by the gross market value.3 As depicted in
Figure 1.1, the gross market value reached the peak of USD 5.6 trillion at the end of
2008 and then declined, like the notional amount, to the value of USD 453 billion in June
2015. The overall transfer of credit risk, despite reflecting a still sizeable market, is less
astonishing than the overall size of the CDS market in gross notional amount.
Figure 1.1: Global Gross Notional Amount and Gross Market Value of the CDS Market – This figure
presents the evolution of the global gross notional amount outstanding (on the left vertical axis) and global
gross market value (on the right vertical axis) in the CDS market. Values are in billions of US dollars; the
data is based on the bi-annual survey conducted by the Bank for International Settlements (www.bis.org).
The rapid growth of the market, the rise to a chain of linked exposures between
dealers of CDSs and the excessive speculation in credit risk are among the reasons why
3The BIS defines the gross market value as “the sums of the absolute values of all open contracts with
either positive or negative replacement values evaluated at market prices prevailing on the reporting date”
(BIS, 2015).
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trading in credit default swaps is accused of having contributed to worsen both the sub-
prime crisis in US and the sovereign crisis in EU. The implications on welfare, the role in
the crisis and the related literature on this topic are further assessed in Subsection 1.2.4.
1.2.3 Insurance
A CDS is analogous to an insurance contract: the buyer pays a periodic premium and, in
return, receives a sum of money if, before the expiration, one of the events specified in the
contract occurs. It is then easy to argue that the moral hazard implied by CDSs is similar
to that implied by traditional insurance. However, CDSs are not regulated as insurance
contracts and, among market participants, the so-called “Potts opinion” is widely accep-
ted. This is an opinion which the lawyer Robin Potts gave to ISDA in 1997 and in which
it was concluded that credit derivatives should not be characterised as insurance contracts
(see, Schmaltz and Thivaios, 2014 and the cited literature supporting the argument that
CDSs are not insurance). However, the economic equivalence between the two instru-
ments, fuelled the discussion in favour of regulating CDSs as insurance contracts (see,
e.g. Kimball-Stanley, 2008; Saunders, 2010; Juurikkala, 2011; and Juurikkala, 2012).
Since CDSs are not subject to the insurance contract regulation, they cannot be in-
validated if buyers have no interest in the insured entity. Thus, it is possible to buy credit
protection on a reference entity, even without having any material interest which may
be adversely affected by a credit event. In other words, investors can take speculative
positions on the market via the so-called naked, or uncovered, CDS.
The exponential growth of the market before the onset of the 2007-08 US financial
crisis and the rise of CDS spreads during the sovereign financial crisis in Europe, in-
flamed the discussion on the destabilising role of naked CDSs both in academic literature
and in the press. The main argument against uncovered CDSs can be summarised as
follows: distress on financial market increases the incentives to buy credit protection via
CDSs, for both hedging and speculative purposes. While purchases in CDSs for hedging
can only be limited to the exposure of the investor to a given entity, there is not a the-
oretical limit to the number of speculative positions that an investor can take via naked
CDSs. This may negatively affect the cost of funding for troubled entities. Additionally,
given that the few dealers of CDSs act both as sellers and buyers of protection, the result
7
Chapter 1. Credit default swaps: a literature survey
is a chain between institutions which poses systemic and domino effect risks.
In the wake of these critiques, and following the uncontrolled rise of sovereign bond
yields in Europe, in November 2012 the European Council approved a ban of uncovered
position in sovereign CDSs in the European Union.4 The main objective of the EU
regulatory intervention was to reduce the magnitude of speculation on sovereign CDSs.
Nevertheless, Juurikkala (2012), among others, recalls that many aspects may prevent
this regulation from being effective, namely, the over-the-counter nature of CDSs, the
worldwide framework of financial markets and the absence of a similar rule in the US.
With the aim to contribute to this literature and to fuel the discussion on the role
of speculation in CDSs, in Chapter 3, we assess the role of speculation in an optimal
portfolio with CDS for an agent maximising the expected utility of his or her final wealth.
1.2.4 Welfare implication
CDSs have been widely blamed to be among the main causes of the US sub-prime crisis,
as well as the Euro-zone sovereign debt crisis. In the former instance, CDSs were mainly
criticised for their role in the burst of the housing bubble; in the latter case, commentators
argue that speculation in CDSs has accelerated the rise of sovereign bonds yields. A
detailed discussion of the role of CDSs in the sub-prime crisis can be found in Stulz
(2010), while Fostel et al. (2015) explain how CDSs contributed to the burst of the bubble.
Empirical evidence of speculation in CDSs on the sovereign crisis has been reported, for
instance, by Delatte et al. (2012) and Chiarella et al. (2015).
The main argument in favour of a CDS ban is that the use of such contracts cre-
ates moral hazard: in distressed situations, unhedged creditors would favour and support
bankruptcy over a renegotiations of the debt, especially for sovereign entities (see, e.g.
Bolton and Oehmke, 2011). On the other side, CDSs, like any other derivative, increase
welfare and market efficiency by facilitating risk-sharing among investors, by improving
price discovery, and by making the allocation of capital more efficient (Stulz, 2010).
In the academic literature there are different views and opposite empirical results of
the impact of CDS trading on welfare and market efficiency. For example, there are
4Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on
short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps.
8
1.3. Modelling
studies which find that CDSs: (i) reduce monitoring incentives for banks (Parlour and
Winton, 2013; Arping, 2014), (ii) create adverse selection in the bank-debtor relationship
(Duffee and Zhou, 2001), (iii) exacerbate counterparty risk (Stephens and Thompson,
2014), (iv) increase systemic and contagion risks (Allen and Carletti, 2006). At the same
time, there are also studies which argue that CDS trading implies: (i) more efficient
risk sharing (Duffee and Zhou, 2001; Thompson, 2010), (ii) improved risk management
(Norden et al., 2014), (iii) lower borrowing costs (Salomao, 2015), (iv) better pricing of
credit risk and less frictions in credit markets (Ashcraft and Santos, 2009) and (v) better
liquidity on the bond market (Massa and Zhang, 2012).
The largely mixed conclusion on the effect of CDS trading does not allow to draw
a final assessment on the impact on welfare of such derivative instruments. Mixed and
opposite results may also be a consequence of the low quality of data available on credit
default swaps. The low level of regulation and the opacity of the market limit the public
availability of data and only few researchers have the privilege to access to high quality
data. A regulatory intervention aimed also to improve the quality and granularity of data,
may have a positive impact on the quality of the research and, consequently, lead to a
clearer picture on the welfare implication of the CDS trading.
The goal of Chapters 2 and 3 is to contribute to this literature and to additionally fuel
the discussion on the implication of CDS trading on the economy.
1.3 Modelling
One of the first works on the CDS pricing can be found in Duffie (1999). In that paper,
a simple arbitrage-free pricing model is presented by setting the CDS equal to the value
of a portfolio containing a default free and a defaultable floating-rate bond. The author
shows that a protection buyer’s cash flows can be replicated by purchasing the default-
free bond, at price G(t0, T ), and simultaneously taking a short position on a defaultable
bond, at price B(t0, T ), both issued in t0 at par-value and with the same maturity T .
Thus, the protection buyer receives the interest rate r(t) from the default-free bond and
pays the interest rate δB(t) on the defaultable bond. In the case a credit event occurs
before maturity, the protection buyer liquidates the portfolio at the coupon date immedi-
ately following the event, obtaining the par-value from the default-free bond and paying
9
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the market value of the defaultable bond, B(τ, τ). The pay-off of this portfolio is con-
sequently equal to that of a CDS on the same defaultable bond, whose spread is called
δX(t).
Table 1.1: Simple Arbitrage Pricing Model – This table shows the payoff of both the arbitrage portfolio and
a credit default swap written on the same defaultable bond, in a simple three period model. G(t0, T ) is the
price of a default-free bond at time t0 whose maturity is T ; B(t0, T ) is the price, in t0, of a defaultable
bond whose maturity is T ; r(t) is the riskless interest rate at time t; δB(t) is the interest rate paid by the
defaultable bond at time t; δX(t) the CDS spread at time t; and τ is the default time.
Arbitrage portfolio Credit default swap
t0 B(t0, T )−G(t0, T ) 0
t r(t)− δB(t) −δX(t)
τ ≤ T G(T, T )−B(τ, τ) 1−B(τ, τ)
τ > T G(T, T )−B(T, T ) 0
Assuming a simple three period model and that the default of the reference entity
can occur in τ > t, the arbitrage-free pricing model proposed by Duffie (1999) can be
summarised as in Table 1.1.
It follows that, in absence of arbitrage, the CDS spread must be equal to the spread
over the risk-free rate of the underlying bond issued by a reference entity:
δX(t) = δB(t)− r(t). (1.1)
As we will discuss in Section 1.5, such arbitrage relationship, in reality, can be seen
only as an approximation. Actually, several frictions prevent the two spreads from being
equal when the bond and the CDS are written on the same reference entity and have
the same maturity. In order to departure from this arbitrage-free relationship, a number
of more advanced CDS pricing frameworks have been developed borrowing from the
literature on credit risk. The most commonly used approaches to model CDSs can be
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grouped in structural models and reduced-form models. The main difference between
the two approaches lies in the model specification of the default time: while structural
models assume that default occurs when an exogenously modelled asset value crosses a
given threshold, in reduced-form models the default time is specified using an exogenous
intensity process. Default can be predicted in the first case, while it is a random event in
the second case.
The structural approach to credit risk pricing is influenced by the pricing framework
developed in Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974). These models assume that
the value of a firm’s assets evolves randomly over time and the default occurs when the
firm’s asset value falls below a given threshold. Typically, asset value is modelled by a
stochastic process such as a geometric Brownian motion and credit spreads are determ-
ined by firm’s characteristics, such as leverage and asset volatility, and market conditions,
such as interest rates. Through these models, it is then possible to estimate either the risk-
neutral default probability or the credit spread on the debt of the firm. However, despite
the fact that the structural approach is widely used in credit risk modelling, several stud-
ies find that, empirically, they do not accurately explain the magnitude of credit spread
(see Section 1.4 for more details).
Reduced form models assume that the default time follows a Poisson process and
occurs randomly based on an underlying probability distribution. Despite this approach
has proven to be more successful in practical terms (Jarrow and Protter, 2012), it does
not formulate any economic argument about the reasons of default. In the context of
CDSs pricing, reduced-form models are used to value the premium (fixed) leg and the
protection (floating) leg of the swap. The premium leg is defined as a series of payments
made until the earlier between the contract maturity and a contingent credit event, while
the protection leg is the contingent payment made upon occurrence of the credit event,
if it happens before the CDS maturity. It is then possible to quantify the CDS spread by
considering that, at inception, the value of the swap must be zero, that is, the expected
present value of the premium leg must be equal to the expected present value of the
protection leg. This will be analysed in greater details in Subsection 1.3.1.
A common view is that the two approaches for modelling credit risk are competing
and disconnected (see, e.g. Duffie, 2002; Bielecki and Rutkowski, 2004; or Lando, 2004)
and there is a debate in the professional and academic literature as to which class of
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models is best in terms of default prediction and hedging performance (see Anderson and
Sundaresan, 2000; Jarrow et al., 2003; Eom et al., 2004; Ericsson and Reneby, 2005). In
this context, Jarrow and Protter (2012) show that the reduced form model can be obtained
from structural model if a smaller, incomplete, information set is used. Specifically,
the authors argue that structural models assume complete knowledge of a very detailed
information set, akin to that held by the firm’s managers; while reduced form models
assume knowledge of a less detailed information set, akin to that observed by the market.
Their main conclusion is that the structural models can be transformed into the reduced
form models as the information set changes and becomes less refined, shrinking from the
information available to the firm’s management to that available to the market.
1.3.1 A focus on reduced form models
Reduced form models describe default by means of an exogenous jump process and were
originally introduced by Jarrow and Turnbull (1995). In the basic framework, the default
time τ is defined as the first jump time of a Poisson process with intensity rate λ(t).
The (risk neutral) probability of default within time [t, t+ dt) conditional to non-earlier
default is then characterised by
Pr[τ < t+ dt | τ ≥ t] = λ(t)dt. (1.2)
It can be shown that the survival probability to time T , conditional on survival to the
valuation time t, Q(t, T ), is given by
Q(t, T ) = e−
´ T
t λ(s)ds. (1.3)
Following this approach, the premium (fixed) leg of a CDS (P (s, T )) can be ex-
pressed, under the risk-neutral probability measure Q, as
P (s, T ) = EQt
[ˆ T
t
δe−
´ s
t r(u)+λ(u)duds
]
, (1.4)
in which r(t) is the riskless interest rate and δ is the constant spread of the CDS which
is continuously paid. Similarly, assuming that, in case of default, the bond holder will
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recover a fraction (1− w) of the par value of the bond, the protection (floating) leg of a
CDS (PR(s, T )), can be expressed as
PR(s, T ) = EQt
[ˆ T
t
(1− w(s))λ(s)e−
´ s
t r(u)+λ(u)duds
]
. (1.5)
Setting the two legs equal, the CDS spread is given by
δ =
EQt
[´ T
t (1− w(s))λ(s)e−
´ s
t r(u)+λ(u)duds
]
EQt
[´ T
t e
− ´ st r(u)+λ(u)duds
] . (1.6)
In this way, the CDS spread can be seen as a weighted average of risk-adjusted ex-
pected losses.
Default intensity and risk-free rate
Reduced form models are particularly suitable for modelling credit spreads and allow
easy calibration of CDS spreads. Consequently, this family of models is commonly used
to infer implied default probabilities from market quotes. In this context, following the
pricing framework proposed by Duffie and Singleton (1997), the riskless rate and the
default intensity are usually calibrated by assuming their independence. This simplifying
assumption makes the discount factor D(t, T ) = e−
´ T
t r(s)ds independent of the default
time τ (see, e.g. Hull and White, 2000; Longstaff et al., 2005; Brigo and Alfonsi, 2005;
Houweling and Vorst, 2005; or Schneider et al., 2011 among others).
The dynamic interactions between interest rates and credit spreads have important
implications for credit risk modelling (Chen et al., 2013). While the independence as-
sumption has significant computational benefits, it is often considered to be unlikely.
Early studies have often identified a negative relationship between credit spreads and
short-term interest rates (Duffee, 1998). Thus, in a number of works (e.g. Feldhütter
and Lando, 2008; Frühwirth et al., 2010; or Driessen, 2005) a negative loading of the
instantaneous interest rate is directly incorporated into the credit-spread specification.
As argued by Hull and White (2000), the independence assumption can be justified
by an offset of the effects of interest rates and default probabilities acting in opposite
directions. For instance, high default probabilities may have two effects: (i) increase
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rates at which future payoffs are discounted, and (ii) reduce market values for bonds
issued by the reference entity. As a consequence, the first effect reduces the CDS spread,
while the second acts in the opposite way.
In Chapter 3, when performing the numerical simulation of our optimal portfolio
model with CDS, we set the covariance between the default intensity and risk-free rate
equal to zero. In this way we assume that the two variables follow two independent
stochastic processes.5
1.3.2 Optimal portfolio choices with defaultable assets
Structural and reduced form models have been used by many researchers to model default
in the context of portfolio optimisation problems. Following the work of Merton (1969),
who initiated the use of stochastic dynamic programming techniques to solve continuous-
time optimal portfolio problems, there has been significant interest in continuous-time
maximisation problems. Initially, the literature was focused on markets consisting of
default-free securities. More recently, a number of studies developed optimal portfolio
models with securities subject to default. For instance Korn and Kraft (2003) study, in a
Merton structural default framework, optimal portfolio problems with defaultable assets.
In a similar framework, Kraft and Steffensen (2006) extended the analysis by defining the
default as the first passage time of an economic state variable below a given threshold.
There is an extensive literature which models default event in the context of portfolio
optimisation using reduced form approach. One of the first studies is Walder (2002), who
studies the optimal portfolio problem for an agent that can invest in a treasury bond and
a portfolio of corporate zero-coupon bonds. One major weakness of that study is that,
to obtain tractable results, the author assumes a zero recovery rate. Bielecki and Jang
(2006) derive optimal investment strategies for a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
investor, who can allocate the wealth among a defaultable bond, a risk-free bank account
and a stock. The authors explicitly include the recovery rate in the model. In a similar
framework, Bo et al. (2010) study an infinite horizon portfolio optimisation problem, in
which an agent can dynamically choose a consumption rate and allocate his/her wealth
5The model developed in Chapter 3 allows the default intensity and the risk-free rate to be correlated. We
make the assumption of independence between the two variables for the sake of simplifying the simulations
of the model.
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in a market where three financial securities are listed: a defaultable perpetual bond, a
default-free risky asset, and a money market account.
Another branch of the literature, which is closely related to decisions in presence of
credit default swaps, relates to portfolio choices with mortality contingent claims. In this
context, and similarly to the firm’s default process in reduced form models, the force of
mortality of individuals is modelled as a Poisson process with stochastic intensity. There
is an extensive literature on this topic and a number of studies successfully model optimal
consumption and portfolio choices in presence of mortality risk. One of the first paper
which deals with such optimisation problem is Dahl (2004). That paper investigates the
risk management for insurance companies by developing a model in which the mortality
intensity follows a stochastic process, and in which some traded assets depend on the
development of such process. Following that paper, a number of studies analyse optimal
portfolio choices in similar frameworks (see, e.g. Battocchio et al., 2007, Menoncin,
2009, Menoncin and Regis, 2015).
Despite the extensive literature on optimal portfolio choices with defaultable securit-
ies or mortality risk, to the best of our knowledge, the only paper studying optimal asset
allocation with CDSs is Bo and Capponi (2016). In that paper, the authors include credit
derivatives in a dynamic portfolio optimization framework and develop a contagion credit
risk model with interacting default intensities. Precisely, they consider a portfolio con-
sisting of two CDSs, with the main goal to assess the impact of default contagion on the
optimal CDS strategy.
In Chapter 3 we contribute to the very limited literature on optimal portfolio choices
with CDSs. In particular, we derive the optimal investment strategy for an agent with hy-
perbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) who can invest in a risk-free asset, a defaultable
bond, and a CDS written on the bond.
1.4 The determinants of credit default swap spreads
CDS spreads should reflect market expectations about the financial health of a reference
entity, and, accordingly, allow to infer the implicit default probability. This section re-
views the empirical literature that explores the determinants of credit risk and analyses
the variables that are used to decompose spread variations.
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There is a significant literature that empirically analyses the factors that determine
credit risk using spreads as a proxy, in different periods and with different type of ref-
erence entities. For instance, Collin-Dufresn et al. (2001), Longstaff et al. (2005) and
Bedendo and Colla (2015) focus on corporate CDSs; Pan and Singleton (2008), Long-
staff et al. (2011) and Dieckmann and Plank (2012) use sovereign CDSs; Annaert et al.
(2013) and Hasan et al. (2015) are two of the few studies which analyses the determinants
of CDSs written on banks. Those studies decompose the explained part of CDS spreads
changes according to various risk drivers.
Regardless the type of underlying reference entity, structural models represent the
starting point for the selection of the variables explaining CDS premiums. In Merton
(1974), for instance, the credit spread of a company should be primarily determined by
the asset volatility of the firm’s balance sheet, the financial leverage and the risk-free
term structure. However, it has been shown that variables defined in a structural credit
risk model explain only a limited part of credit spread variations. For example, Eom
et al. (2004) empirically test five structural models of corporate bond pricing and find
that the predicted spreads are not accurate. Similar results are found also in Chen et al.
(2006), where, using CDS spreads to estimate and compare models, the authors find
that structural models either overestimate or underestimate actual price levels. Similarly,
Ericsson et al. (2009) investigate the linear relationship between theoretical determinants
of default risk and default swap spread and find that a minimal set of theoretical determ-
inants of default risk are consistent with theory and are significant both statistically and
economically. Additionally, González-Hermosillo (2008) show that the impact of proxy
variables is strongly time-varying on CDS spreads.
To improve the fit of structural models, many authors have added variables that cap-
ture market conditions. It has been documented that credit spreads and default probabil-
ities vary through the business cycle. Additionally, it is necessary to distinguish between
different types of reference entities. In fact, variables that are found to be explanatory for
non-financial companies, may lose their relevance when applied to financial entities (e.g.
Raunig and Scheicher, 2009 and Grammatikos and Vermeulen, 2012).
In the next subsections we group explanatory variables into two sets: (i) factors which
are specific to the reference entity, directly affecting its default probability, and (ii) factors
that are representative of market conditions, affecting indirectly the entity’s probability
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of default.
1.4.1 Reference entity specific variables
In this set, one of the most commonly used variable is the stock return of the reference
entity. As explained, among others, by Collin-Dufresn et al. (2001), stock returns can
be seen as a proxy for financial leverage. In fact, if stock returns are positive, leverage
measured in market values will decrease, leading to lower credit spreads. Additionally,
stock returns can capture also other factors, as they reflect the entity future profitability:
positive returns indicate positive future prospects and, consequently, lower default risk.
As a result, there exists a negative relationship between stock returns and credit spreads.
Another variable taken into consideration by the existing literature is the idiosyncratic
volatility: an increase in asset volatility should positively affect the probability to hit the
default threshold. Many asset volatility measures are used in the literature. For instance,
Annaert et al. (2013) measure volatility as standard deviation of daily stock returns over
different rolling windows (7 days, 25 days and 50 days). Similarly, in Bedendo and Colla
(2015) the volatility is computed as the standard deviation of stock returns over a 180-
day rolling window. In the context of credit risk determinants, the best way to measure
volatility would be to use intraday stock volatility, as it would be able to capture the daily
fluctuations of stock prices; however, such a measure is rarely available from standard
data providers.
Longstaff et al. (2005) argue that bond illiquidity is priced into credit spreads, and, in
fact, few studies include, in their specifications, proxies for the liquidity of the reference
entity. However, it is often underlined the difficulty in finding an adequate proxy, as in-
dividual liquidity is hardly observable on the market. For example, Annaert et al. (2013)
measure individual liquidity as the difference between CDS bid and ask quotes. They
argue that the bid-ask spread is mostly correlated with liquidity proxies such as data on
trades. We believe that CDS bid-ask spreads are indeed a measure of the CDS liquidity,
but cannot be considered as an adequate proxy of the liquidity position of the reference
entity. Departing from this reasoning, in the next chapter, we develop an empirical ana-
lysis to assess the impact of global and specific variables on banks’ credit spreads. In
our specification we include confidential data on the recourse to Eurosystem refinancing
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operations as a proxy of banks’ individual liquidity. We believe that this measure, which
however could not be used for non-financial credit spreads, can reflect adequately the
liquidity position of a financial institution.
1.4.2 Global variables
One main issue arising from the basic specification proposed by structural models is
that model residuals contain common variation. As pointed out by Collin-Dufresn et al.
(2001), the reason behind the common variation in the residuals is the omission of ex-
planatory variables, which are likely not firm-specific. The solution used in the literature
to overcome this issue is the inclusion of variables that capture general market and eco-
nomic conditions about equity, fixed income, and currency markets (see, e.g. Annaert
et al., 2013 or Bedendo and Colla, 2015).
One widely used global measure is the risk-free interest rate. Its inclusion follows
the Merton (1974) model in which the risk-free rate is the drift in the risk neutral world;
the higher it is, the less likely default becomes. Hence, there should exist a negative
relationship between risk-free and credit spreads. This confirms the results of Duffee
(1998) and the later studies which assume a negative relationship between the two factors
as described in Section 1.3.
A second, widely used, global factor is the general business climate: improvements
in business conditions decrease probabilities of default and increase recovery rates. The
business climate is frequently captured by variables which reflect the evolution of stock,
fixed income and currency markets. For instance, some of the variables which are used
to capture general business climate are: (i) stock market indices returns, (ii) stock mar-
ket volatility indices, (iii) government bond indices, (iv) corporate bonds indices, or (v)
exchange rates.
More recently, few studies underlined the importance of the role of the sovereign risk
on credit spreads both for non-financial (Bai and Wei, 2012) and financial institutions
(Avino and Cotter, 2014). The rationale behind this is straightforward: the financial dis-
tress of a government is likely to affect negatively the corporate sector, as the government
would transfer the debt burden onto the financial sector. To the best of our knowledge,
Bedendo and Colla (2015) is one of the first studies which includes sovereign CDS as
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a determinant of credit spreads. The authors find that an increase in sovereign risk is
associated with an increase in the credit risk of the reference entity.
The statistical significance of sovereign risks on financial and non-financial credit
spreads fuels the discussion on the empirical relevance of risk measures on CDS spreads.
The recent financial crisis has shown how an increase in global risk could also affect
credit spreads of entities which are not directly involved in a crisis through contagion
and spillover effects. To the best of our knowledge, however, no existing studies consider
wider risk measures as global relevant factors for credit spreads. In the empirical analysis
presented in the next chapter, we further analyse the role of global risk by including
measures of systemic risk as determinant of a bank’s credit risk spreads.
1.5 Relationship between credit default swaps and bonds
As shown in equation 1.1, there should exist a parity relationship between CDS and
bond spreads, and accordingly the so-called CDS basis should be equal to zero (see, e.g.
Choudhry, 2006). However, a number of reasons can explain the actual existence of
a spreads differential: the cheaper to delivery option embed in the CDS contract,6 for
example, can lead to a negative basis (i.e. CDS spread larger than bond spread), while
the counterparty risk of the protection seller or the exclusion of accrued interests in the
CDS payment triggered by the credit event can lead to a positive basis (i.e. bond spread
larger than CDS spread).
The existence of a spread basis has contributed to the development of two branches
of the empirical literature on CDSs. The next subsections review the literature which
analyses: (i) reasons and causes behind the CDS basis, and (ii) the mechanism of incor-
poration of new information into bond and CDS spreads.
1.5.1 Parity relationship and spread basis
The drivers of the CDS-bond basis are investigated by a number of studies. Longstaff
et al. (2005) is one of the first studies providing evidence relating to the basis, using
6Cheaper to delivery option refers to the possibility for the protection buyer, after the credit event, to
choose between a basket of deliverable bonds in the case of physical delivery.
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CDS data for 68 financial and non-financial firms, mainly listed on US and UK markets,
from March 2001 to October 2002. Assuming that credit default swap spreads reflect
a measure of default risk, the authors use the CDS basis as a proxy for the non-default
component. They conclude that the basis is strongly related to the illiquidity of the bond
market.
Nashikkar et al. (2011) analyse the CDS basis over the period from July 2002 to
June 2006, for 1,167 firms. The authors investigate the non-default component of bond
spreads, by running regressions of the basis on measures of bond liquidity and other
factors. Their main finding is that both latent liquidity and CDS bid-ask spread have
significant explanatory power for the basis.
While early studies find the basis to be positive prior to 2007, Fontana (2011) shows
that, during the 2007-09 crisis, the difference between bond and CDS, on the same ref-
erence entity, turned negative. Consequently, a number of studies investigate the drivers
of the CDS-bond basis during and after the US subprime crisis. In this context, Gârleanu
and Pedersen (2011) develop an asset pricing model, in which the funding constraints
can give rise to price differences between two financial instruments with identical cash
flows but different margin requirements. They empirically test the model predictions
for the basis using CDS and bond data over the 2005-2009 period. The authors con-
clude that the time-series variation in the basis is closely related to the shadow cost of
capital. This supports the theories which argue that the basis became negative due to de-
leveraging activity of financial institutions: strong selling activities on the bond market
may have decreased bond prices, driving the basis in negative domain. However, this
theory has been challenged by Choi and Shachar (2014). Using data from the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York on dealers’ aggregate bond inventories, they argue that, after
Lehman Brothers’ default, dealers were “providing liquidity” by purchasing corporate
bonds from hedge funds. They thus conclude that, while dealers were “leaning against
the basis,” their activity was insufficient to close the basis gap.
Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2011) investigate the negative and persistent basis during
crisis and post-crisis periods, using a sample of 487 firms with single-name CDS. To
explain the non-zero basis between CDSs and bonds, they identify a set of proxies for
trading frictions, such as liquidity, funding cost, and counterpart risk. Subsequently, the
authors find that, while during the crisis their proxies explain the non-zero basis, most of
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the factors lose their explanatory power after the crisis.
In summary, the majority of empirical studies find that the basis is mainly driven by
the different degree of liquidity in the two markets. Generally speaking, several factors
underpin a greater liquidity of the CDS market: (i) CDS contracts can be sold in arbit-
rarily large amounts, while bonds are limited in supply; (ii) naked credit default swaps
allow the possibility of taking short positions in bonds, without trading on the bond mar-
ket; (iii) on a given borrower, the bond market is significantly more fragmented than the
CDS market, as it is made up of a number of issuances, usually characterised by differ-
ent rates; (iv) bonds are often purchased as part of a buy and hold strategy, reducing the
liquidity.
1.5.2 Leading process in price discovery
The existence of the CDS basis raises the issue of which market has the leading role in
price discovery process.7 Intuitively, the bond market should be the first to incorporate
the new information and derivative instruments should then adjust to its movement. If this
were not the case, trading in CDSs would be able to affect the price of bonds or, in other
words, the financing costs of corporate, financial or sovereign entities. Consequently,
speculation activity in CDSs could have serious effects on the stability of financial mar-
kets.
The price discovery process has been initially analysed by estimating a vector error
correction model (VECM) as in Hasbrouck (1995). If we model two dependent market
one of which has a leading role in the price discovery process, then they will converge to
their equilibria with different speeds. Specifically, the adjustment of the leading market
price on the follower market price will be slower. Such a mechanism can be described by
a VECM, in which the error correction coefficients provide a measure for the intensities
of the price adjustments. In order to estimate VECMs, the series of bond and CDS
spreads should be non-stationary and cointegrated.
Following this approach, the price discovery process between bond and CDS markets
has been analysed by a number of authors and in different frameworks. The discussion
7The price discovery on financial markets has been defined as the efficient and timely incorporation of
information into market prices (Lehmann, 2002).
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was initially focused on corporate CDSs. One of the first works in this field is Blanco
et al. (2005). On a sample of 33 investment grade firms (17 from Europe and 16 from
USA) between January 2001 and June 2002, the authors find evidence that the CDS mar-
ket leads the determination of the price of credit risk over the bond market. They argue
that price discovery occurs in the CDS market as it is the most convenient location for the
trading of credit risk, due to structural factors. Zhu (2006) performs a similar analysis
on 24 investment grade entities (8 banks and 16 corporate companies), over the period
between 1999 and 2002, both in the US and the EU. The author shows that derivatives
tend to move ahead of bonds and the CDS market plays a key role in improving the
efficiency of the price discovery mechanism for corporate credit risk.
Subsequently, researchers moved their focus on sovereign CDSs. Conclusions of
studies on emerging markets are similar to those on corporate CDSs. One of the first
papers that focuses on sovereign entities is Ammer and Cai (2011). The authors perform
an empirical study on 9 emerging markets and they find that sovereign CDSs often move
ahead of bonds. Their main conclusion is that the relatively more liquid market tends to
lead the other. Similarly, Aktug et al. (2012) evaluate the dynamic relationship between
the two markets over the period between 2001 and 2007, across 30 emerging countries.
In this case the results suggest that the CDS market has a leading role in 37% of the
cases. Also Hassan et al. (2015) perform price discovery analysis on emerging markets.
Specifically, the authors analyse the bond-CDS relationship on seven sovereign entities
and conclude that, in 71% of the sample, the bond market leads the process by adjusting
to new credit information before the CDS market.
Following the turbulence on Euro-zone countries, academic attention shifted on sov-
ereign CDSs written on European countries. Delatte et al. (2012) analyse the price dis-
covery process in developed member States of the European Union. The main conclu-
sion is that the bond market plays a dominant role only in the core-European countries
and during calm periods. However, the higher the distress, the more the CDS market
dominates the information transmission mechanism. The authors argue that CDSs be-
came a bear-market instrument to speculate against the deteriorating conditions of sov-
ereign countries. Similarly, Coudert and Gex (2013) analyse the price discovery process
between CDS and bond spreads of 17 financial and 18 sovereign entities during the 2007-
2010 period. They conclude that for financial entities the bond market incorporates the
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new information after the CDS market, while for sovereign entities the bond market is
shown to lead the CDS market only for low-yield countries.
All the above cited studies, although focusing their analyses on different type of
entities or on different sample periods, find evidence of a leading role of the CDS market
for a subset of the analysed sample. However, the causes and reasons of this empirical
evidence, which are pointed out by the different authors, are not homogeneous and often
not supported by further analysis. Despite the large number of studies in this field, we
can point out two main issues that we believe are worth further research. Firstly, the
literature analysing the price discovery process for financial entities is scarce. Secondly,
and most importantly, there are no studies, to the best of our knowledge, which try to
evaluate the impact of the leading role of the CDS market on the determinants of credit
risk. In the next chapter, we develop empirical analysis to try to close these gaps in the
literature.
1.6 Conclusion
CDSs are a recent financial innovation and, as such, the academic literature on this topic
is still evolving and growing. In recent years, an increasing number of researchers shifted
their focus on credit default swaps, also driven by the need of investigating the role of
these derivatives in the global financial crisis.
In this work we provide an overview of the existing literature about CDSs. More
precisely, three main areas of research, and their interactions, are reviewed: (i) theoretical
works that model CDS price, (ii) empirical studies which analyse the determinants of
CDS spreads, and (iii) empirical studies which assess the relationship between CDSs and
underlying bonds.
The results of this survey can be summarised as follows. In relation to the literature
that models CDS, we argue that, while the conceptual foundations of pricing are well
established, the role of CDSs in an optimal portfolio needs to be assessed. Secondly, in
the context of CDS spread determinants we discuss that, despite the significant number
of papers analysing this topic, there is still room for improvement as the variables which
have been identified by existing literature do not fully explain CDS spread variations.
Thirdly, concerning the price discovery process, we identify the absence of studies which
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empirically explore the consequences of a leading role of the CDS market as a relevant
gap in the literature.
The studies reviewed in this work have a common link which we believe translates
into a major question which has not been addressed yet by the literature. While there is a
substantial evidence that CDS trading makes markets more efficient, there is a significant
number of papers which claim the opposite. Further research should aim to assess the
impact that trading in CDSs has on welfare and market efficiency.
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2.1 Introduction
The subprime crisis in the US and the sovereign debt crisis in the EU have raised concerns
on the role of credit default swap (CDS) trading on financial market and the related
implication on financial stability. A CDS is a derivative contract on credit risk, which
is functionally equal to an insurance contract: a (protection) buyer acquires protection
against the default risk of a reference entity, by paying a periodic premium (spread) to a
(protection) seller. Nonetheless, such derivatives are not regulated as insurance contracts,
and buyers of CDSs are not required to hold any bond issued by the reference entity the
CDS is written on. This results in the possibility of speculating on the default risk of
corporate, financial, or sovereign entities, via so-called naked, or uncovered, CDSs.
It has been argued that trading activity on the CDS market has been able to exacerbate
the effects of a financial crisis (see e.g. Delatte et al., 2012; Stephens and Thompson,
2014; Chiarella et al., 2015; and Fostel et al., 2015). Turbulences on financial markets
increase the incentives for investors to enter into CDS contracts, by “betting” on the
default of troubled reference entities. The higher demand in CDS protection raises CDS
spreads. Such increase, in return, could affect the yields of underlying bonds, resulting in
higher refinancing costs for a reference entity. Speculation in CDSs could then generate
a vicious circle, therefore exacerbating the effects of a financial crisis.
The reason behind this mechanism is the arbitrage relationships which should exist
between the spread of a bond, with respect to the risk-free rate, and that of a CDS written
on the same bond and with the same maturity. As the price determinants of the two
instruments are the same, the two spreads should always be at par. However, in reality
this arbitrage relationship rarely holds, as there often exists a spread basis. This raises the
key issue of which market firstly incorporates the new information, or, in other words,
which of the two instruments leads the price discovery process (PDP).
The aim of this study is to analyse the interactions between bonds and CDSs written
on European banks, and to explore the implications of a leading role of the CDS market in
the process of price discovery. In this context, two main branches of the literature in CDS
are directly related to this study: papers which study the PDP between bonds and CDSs,
and studies which decompose the explained part of CDS spreads changes according to
various risk drivers.
34
2.1. Introduction
The price discovery process between bond and CDS markets has been recently ana-
lysed by a number of authors, in different frameworks and for different underlying entities
(see, e.g. Blanco et al., 2005; Zhu, 2006; Ammer and Cai, 2011; Coudert and Gex, 2013;
or Delatte et al., 2012). The empirical literature on this topic is quite wide and the con-
clusions are, to some extent, similar: CDSs have the lead in price discovery process for
some subsets of the analysed samples. However, we can point out two main weaknesses
of existing literature: (i) there is very little empirical work on CDSs written on banks and
(ii) existing studies do not extend their analysis to the understanding of the implication
of a leading role of the CDS market.
In this chapter, we analyse the PDP between bonds and CDSs for 32 European banks,
between 1 January 2011 and 31 December 2013. We require that banks have the follow-
ing characteristics: (i) are headquartered in Europe, (ii) have access, directly or indir-
ectly, to refinancing operations within the European Central Bank (ECB), and (iii) have
outstanding debt instruments that are priced on European markets. The reasons behind
these requirements and the selection of the sample period will be clarified in the next
sections. The results of this analysis show that the CDS market has a dominant role on
the bond market for 15 banks.
In order to deepen the implications of these results, we perform a second analysis to
assess the behaviour of credit risk determinants when the CDS market is in the lead. To
do so, we split our sample into two subgroups on the basis of the outcome of the PDP ana-
lysis and we decompose the explained part of CDS spreads changes according to various
risk drivers. A number of authors empirically analysed the factors that determine credit
risk using CDS spreads as a proxy (see Annaert et al. (2013) and the cited literature).
We improve the specifications proposed by the existing studies by adding, as explanatory
variables, confidential data owned by the ECB. The results show that, when the CDS
market has the leading role in price discovery process, there exists stronger transmission
mechanisms of credit risk from sovereign entities to banks.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 presents the price
discovery analysis, Section 2.3 presents the determinants of credit risk and explores the
impact of the leading role of CDS on credit risk determinants, and Section 2.4 concludes.
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2.2 Price discovery analysis
Price discovery on financial markets has been defined as the efficient and timely incor-
poration of information into market prices (Lehmann, 2002).
The main function of a CDS is the transfer of credit risk of a reference entity from
a protection buyer to a protection seller. In brief, a CDS can be seen as an insurance
contract on the notional value of a bond and, in case of default of the bond issuer, the
derivative pays back the underlying face value or the loss given default (LGD), depending
on the type of settlement specified in the contract. In theory, a portfolio with a CDS and
the underlying bond eliminates all the risks associated with the default of the reference
entity and, hence, it should have a return equal to the risk free rate. This implies that
there should exist a parity relationship between the CDS premium and the spread of the
underlying bond on the risk free rate (Duffie, 1999). Arbitrage activity should reduce any
price differences between the two markets over time. However, in reality, bond spreads
and CDS premia are not at parity for several reasons, such as the cheaper to delivery
option embedded in CDS contracts, short selling constraints on bond markets, accrued
interest, and counterparty risk.1
The existence of a spread basis raises the issue of which of the two markets has the
leading role in price discovery process. Intuitively, the bond market should incorporate
first the new information and derivatives, by definition, should adjust to its movement.
However, if the process is reversed and the new information is firstly incorporated by
the derivative market, then trading in CDSs would influence bond prices. This would
imply that the financing cost of firms, financial institutions or governments would be set
by an over-the-counter derivative market, characterised by low levels of transparency and
regulation. Considering also that market participants can speculate on the risk of default
by entering into naked CDSs, then the leading role of the CDS market may have potential
negative consequences on financial stability.
For these reasons, the price discovery process between bond and CDS has become
a relevant research topic, which has been recently analysed by a number of studies. For
example, Blanco et al. (2005) is one of the first papers exploring the relationship between
1For a more detailed explanation of the parity relationship between bond and CDS spreads, the reader is
invited to refer to Sections 1.3 and 1.5 of this thesis.
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the two markets in the context of price discovery. In that study, on a sample of 33 invest-
ment grade firms (17 from Europe and 16 from USA) between January 2001 and June
2002, the authors find evidence of a leading role of the CDS market on bond prices. It is
argued that price discovery occurs in the CDS market as it is the most convenient location
for the trading of credit risk, due to structural factors.
Evidence of a leading role of CDSs is found also on sovereign entities. Ammer and
Cai (2011), for instance, analyse the discovery process on 9 emerging markets between
2001 and 2005 and find that sovereign CDSs often move ahead of bonds. The main
conclusion of that study is that the relatively more liquid market tends to lead the other.
Delatte et al. (2012) perform a similar analysis on developed members of the European
Union. The authors show that the bond market plays a dominant role only in the core-
European countries and during calm periods. However, during distressed periods the
CDS market dominates the information transmission mechanism. The main conclusion
is that, during the EU sovereign crisis, credit default swaps became a bear-market instru-
ment to speculate against the deteriorating conditions of sovereign countries.
In this section we investigate the price discovery process between CDS and underly-
ing bond spreads within the European banking sector.
2.2.1 Data description
Our analysis focuses on European banks on which CDS quotes are available and li-
quid, and which have issued Euro-denominated bonds. The analysis includes 32 banks
headquartered in the main European countries and covers the period between 1 January
2011 and 31 December 2013. We select this period, first of all, to be in line with existing
studies which consider, on average, a sample period between one to four years. Secondly,
we aim to include both a period characterised by high volatility on the CDS market and
a period of relative financial stability. In this regard, high volatility on the CDS market
has been observed over the periods between August 2011 and July 2012 and between
April and August 2013.2 Finally, the range selection takes also into consideration the
availability of data used for the analysis carried in Section 2.3.
2We proxy the volatility on the CDS market by computing the weekly standard deviation of the iTraxx
index on European banks.
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To perform the price discovery analysis, we use Euro-denominated daily CDSs data.
We obtain, from Datastream, CDS quotes for senior unsecured debt on a 5-year maturity.
Accordingly, we need bond with the same maturity and of the same currency. Given
that, in practice, it is nearly impossible to find debt instruments that have maturities that
exactly match those of CDS, we need to estimate the implicit 5-year spot rate for each
bank using bonds of different maturities.
To achieve high degree of consistency, we carry out the following procedure:
1. For each bank, we search in Datastream and Bloomberg for zero coupon bonds
(ZCBs) with maturities from 3 months to 15 years. For banks with a sufficient
number of listed ZCBs and with a complete structure of maturities, we then es-
timate the 5-year yield using the Nielson-Siegel model (Nelson and Siegel, 1987).
Unfortunately, only few banks have a sufficient number of ZCBs.
2. To estimate the 5-year yield for those banks without enough securities in the mar-
ket, we then search for a ZCB having time to maturity between 3 and 5 years at
the beginning of our sample period, and another ZCB with more than 8 years to
maturity at the beginning of the sample period. For the banks with two ZCBs with
these characteristics, we interpolate the two yields in order to obtain the 5-year
spot rate.
3. For banks without enough ZCBs on the market, we estimate a 5-year yield to ma-
turity by interpolating the yield of available securities. We exclude from our search
floating-rate securities and bonds that have embedded options, step-up coupons or
any special feature that would result in different pricing. To ensure a sufficient
level of liquidity, we exclude bonds for which the trading volume has been equal
to zero in at least one day within the sample period. In this way, we are able to
obtain 5-year yields that are highly correlated with CDS spreads.
As a risk free rate, we use the 5-year spot rate of German bonds obtained from Data-
stream.
Table 2.1 gives an overview of the banks that are included in our study, together with
their country of residence and the estimation method for the 5-year rate. Our sample
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includes credit institutions headquartered in 12 European countries. Overall, out of 32
banks in our sample, 7 are resident outside the Euro-area.
Table 2.2 shows the descriptive statistics of ZCBs and CDS spreads for the reference
entities in our sample. Bond spreads are calculated as the difference between the estim-
ated 5-year rate and the free risk rate. As shown in the table, the rates obtained depict
high correlations with CDS spreads.
2.2.2 Methodology
The econometric discussion used in this section borrows from the existing literature on
CDS and bond markets (see, e.g. Blanco et al., 2005). The majority of existing studies use
a vector error correction model (VECM) to examine the individual adjustment process
towards the long run cointegration relationship.
Considering two related markets and assuming that one of them has the leading role
in price discovery process, it is then plausible to assume that the price is firstly determ-
ined on the leading market, and that the other market will subsequently converge towards
to equilibrium. As a consequence, the two markets will adjust to equilibrium with dif-
ferent speeds. Specifically, the adjustment of the leading market price on the follower
market price will be slower. This mechanism can be described by a VECM, in which the
intensities of the price adjustments are measured by the error correction coefficients.
Financial theory predicts that CDS premium and bond rate move together since they
are both determined by the same underlying factors. Thus, there should exist a long-
run relationship between the two spreads for the same borrower and maturity, driven by
arbitrage principles (i.e. the two series should be cointegrated). This relationship can be
expressed through the following equation:
CDSit = µi + α1BSit + zit, (2.1)
in which CDS and BS are respectively the CDS and the bond spreads for the ith bank,
at time t; µ denotes the bank specific intercept; z is the vector of errors; α1 is the long
run equilibrium coefficient. If there were no arbitrage opportunities in the market (i.e. it
is perfectly efficient) then α1 should be 1 and µi should be 0.
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Table 2.1: Bank list and yield estimation method – This table lists the banks included in our analysis. For each bank, we also report
the home country and the estimation method we use to obtain the 5-year yield
# Bank Country Yield Estimation Method
1 Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Italy Yield to maturity interpolation
2 Banco Comercial Português Portugal Yield to maturity interpolation
3 Banco Popolare Italy Yield to maturity interpolation
4 Banco Popular Español S.A. Spain Yield to maturity interpolation
5 Banco Sabadell S.A. Spain Yield to maturity interpolation
6 Banco Santander S.A. Spain Yield to maturity interpolation
7 Bank of Ireland Ireland Yield to maturity interpolation
8 Bankia Spain Yield to maturity interpolation
9 Barclays Bank UK Yield to maturity interpolation
10 BBVA Spain Yield to maturity interpolation
11 BNL Spa Italy Yield to maturity interpolation
12 BNP Paribas France Nelson-Siegel Model
13 Commerzbank AG Germany Yield to maturity interpolation
14 Crédit Agricole France Yield to maturity interpolation
15 Crédit Mutuel CIC France Yield to maturity interpolation
16 Credit Suisse Switzerland Yield to maturity interpolation
17 Deutsche Bank AG Germany Spot rate interpolation
18 Dexia Credit Local France Yield to maturity interpolation
19 Erste Group Bank AG Austria Yield to maturity interpolation
20 Fortis Bank SA Belgium Spot rate interpolation
21 HSBC Bank UK Yield to maturity interpolation
22 ING Bank Netherlands Yield to maturity interpolation
23 Intesa San Paolo Spa Italy Nelson-Siegel Model
24 Lloyds Bank UK Spot rate interpolation
25 Mediobanca Spa Italy Yield to maturity interpolation
26 Natixis France Spot rate interpolation
27 Nordea Bank AB Sweden Yield to maturity interpolation
28 Société Générale SA France Yield to maturity interpolation
29 The Royal Bank of Scotland UK Yield to maturity interpolation
30 UBS UK Yield to maturity interpolation
31 Unicredit Spa Italy Spot rate interpolation
32 Unione di Banche Italiane Italy Yield to maturity interpolation
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Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics – This table shows summary statistics of the daily bond and CDS spreads. For each bank, we
depict mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum values, in basis points, for both series. Bond spreads are obtained as the
difference between the estimated 5-year bond rate and the 5-year German yield. Last column represents the correlation between the
two spreads
Bank
Estimated Bond Spread Credit Default Swaps
Corr
Mean Sd Max Min Mean Sd Max Min
Banca Monte dei Paschi
di Siena
544.44 152.68 863.88 241.22 509.94 167.30 906.43 178.09 0.8341
Banco Comercial
Português
758.33 269.82 1324.28 368.54 859.15 395.51 1925.5 353.08 0.8524
Banco Popolare 564.13 182.23 1163.85 303.77 501.27 162.26 941.06 183.30 0.8912
Banco Popular Español
S.A.
446.63 92.48 634.76 258.20 564.51 189.81 953.66 222.83 0.8346
Banco Sabadell S.A. 657.08 208.56 1253.30 361.01 506.65 178.85 837.90 195.59 0.7583
Banco Santander S.A. 347.52 98.75 552.17 145.73 293.79 78.08 506.66 122.1 0.8527
Bank of Ireland 1760.11 1069.83 4467.30 676.12 726.50 358.66 1476.67 214.86 0.8732
Bankia 573.01 144.50 883.89 327.27 719.18 270.21 1574.35 220 0.7309
Barclays Bank 406.24 146.38 756.90 209.92 161.77 44.10 277.75 91.28 0.8902
BBVA 430.18 117.38 595.40 205.37 299.73 81.17 515.12 117.98 0.5095
BNL 265.82 43.58 393.19 203.14 169.15 64.88 371.05 82.82 0.8537
BNP Paribas 254.70 98.01 507.67 139.19 171.20 65.28 367.23 80.84 0.9024
Commerzbank AG 235.15 73.73 422.09 123.81 205.87 59.33 379.61 110.05 0.7836
Crédit Agricole 368.48 147.20 696.55 144.19 207.19 68.94 411.06 103.26 0.9051
Crédit Mutuel CIC 368.84 129.60 703.96 205.89 182.48 61.59 356.13 98.53 0.8914
Credit Suisse 214.82 25.06 268.22 162.59 121.08 35.58 212.75 67.07 0.7895
Deutsche Bank AG 235.09 56.07 377.96 149.77 138.85 45.48 327.60 80.76 0.8071
Dexia Credit Local 773.31 404.74 1617.33 275.45 546.01 217.58 977.45 248.89 0.8804
Erste Group Bank AG 165.38 36.17 243.03 88.71 197.51 75.57 425.16 109.33 0.8448
Fortis Bank SA 181.14 53.34 307.71 69.10 147.26 25.52 227.5 95.5 0.8425
HSBC Bank 199.37 44.50 272.52 112.77 104.36 26.74 183.49 62.62 0.6272
ING Bank 135.08 46.35 226.44 53.71 124.98 62.01 277.93 54.35 0.7090
Intesa San Paolo Spa 351.16 122.34 705.85 129.05 310.59 111.48 607.88 126.45 0.9000
Lloyds Bank 259.13 99.94 478.52 69.14 217.96 79.13 398.72 99.09 0.9416
Mediobanca Spa 374.36 123.69 756.71 166.24 283.68 109.80 597.55 124.48 0.9400
Natixis 300.94 26.60 359.74 245.57 191.30 47.72 295.32 102.45 0.7513
Nordea Bank AB 275.56 87.43 522.79 162.63 102.70 38.94 200.37 53.53 0.9655
Société Générale SA 408.17 136.81 713.26 203.32 219.63 84.16 436.41 99.93 0.8932
The Royal Bank of
Scotland
324.08 136.17 666.17 155.05 235.37 74.21 417.91 114.51 0.9353
UBS 209.55 56.96 327.40 129.70 129.63 45.26 246.24 64.64 0.8488
Unicredit Spa 377.62 146.15 835.65 168.70 352.86 125.57 711.72 149.19 0.8571
Unione di Banche Italiane 467.01 254.54 1557.55 113.94 329.04 114.28 661.02 158.81 0.8035
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According to Equation (2.1), the efficient price follows a random walk process with
equilibrium given by zit = 0. If the two spreads are cointegrated, then at least one of the
two series adjusts back to equilibrium in case of short-run deviations (Engle and Granger,
1987).
The contribution of price discovery can then be assessed by investigating the adjust-
ment process to the long-run equilibrium. To do so, we estimate the following VECMs:
∆CDSit = λ1(zit−1) +
p∑
j=1
β1j∆CDSit−j +
p∑
j=1
δ1j∆BSit−j + ε1it, (2.2)
∆BSit = λ2(zit−1) +
p∑
j=1
β2j∆CDSit−j +
p∑
j=1
δ2j∆BSit−j + ε2it, (2.3)
in which λ1 and λ2 are the error correction coefficients, or speed of adjustment coeffi-
cients to the long-run relationship, of the CDS premiums and bond spreads, respectively,
β1j , β2j and δ1j , δ2j are the short-term effects, and ε1it and ε2it are i.i.d. shocks.
The contribution of price discovery depends on the relative values of λ1 and λ2.
Given our cointegration relationship, λ1 must be significant and negative for the CDS
market to adjust on the bond market to incorporate information. On the other hand,
λ2 must be significant and positive for the bond market to adjust on the CDS market.
Thus, if λ1 is significant and negative and λ2 is not significant, then the bond market
has the leading role in price discovery. If λ2 is significant and positive and λ1 is not
significant, then the CDS market is the dominant market. In the case that both coefficients
are significant, then the price discovery process occurs in both markets. In the latter
situation, the dominant market in the process has the lower adjustment speed in absolute
values. In other words, if the adjustment speed of CDS is lower than that of bonds
(|λ1| < |λ2|), the CDS market has a dominant role in price discovery, thus, leading the
bond market.
2.2.3 Empirical analysis and results
To perform the analysis, we follow a three step procedure. First, we check the stationarity
of the two series via Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. If the variables are non-
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stationary, then we perform Johansen Cointegration tests to examine whether there is
a long run relationship between the two markets. If the series are cointegrated, then a
VECM is appropriate to check for the price discovery mechanism as the third and final
step. If variables are not cointegrated, VECM is not a valid approach. Instead, one can
perform Granger Causality tests using first differences. This test allows to assess whether
there exists a pattern of shifts in one series preceding the other.
The results of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (not reported) show that all bond
and CDS series are non-stationary at 5 per cent significance level. Table 2.3 shows the
results of the cointegration analysis. For 26 out of 32 banks, there exists a long run
equilibrium relationship between bond and CDS spreads at 5 per cent significance level.
Given the results of cointegration, we estimate VECMs for 26 banks, while for the
other 6 banks we perform Granger Causality tests. Results are presented in Tables 2.4
and 2.5.
Vector Error Correction Models show that for 12 banks the price discovery process
occurs first on the CDS market. When performing Granger Causality tests for the 6 non-
cointegrated banks, the bond market Granger-causes the CDS market in 3 cases, while
in the other 4 cases, the CDS market Granger-causes the bond market. Therefore we can
conclude that price discovery occurs in the bond market for 2 banks, it occurs in the CDS
market in the 3 other cases and it occurs in both markets for the remaining bank.
This means that the market of derivatives has a leading role on bond spreads for 15
banks, implying that, for nearly 50% of the sample, the price discovery process is, to
some extent, inconsistent with financial theory.
In order to find a possible link between these 15 banks, which may be able to justify
the the leading role of the CDS market, we analysed and compared a number of banks’
specific characteristics. Among other things, we explored descriptive statistics of CDS
and bond spreads, we analysed business models, geographical location, and also balance
sheet data of the banks in our sample. However, we are not able to similarities which
highlight differences between the two subsamples and may justify disparities in price
discovery process.
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Table 2.3: Cointegration Analysis Results – This table shows the result of the cointegration analysis. Second and third columns
present Johansen trace test statistics for the number of cointegrating relationship between CDS and bond spreads for each bank,
under the null hypothesis that the two series are not cointegrated. The fourth column contains the number of lags in the underlying
vector autoregression and last column shows whether the two series are cointegrated or not. A constant is included in the long-term
relation, and the number of lags in the underlying vector autoregression is optimized using the Akaikes Information Criterion for
each entity
Bank
# of Cointegrating vectors # of
Lags
Coint
None At most 1
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena 9.986 4.079 2 N
Banco Comercial Português 8.353 0.183 2 N
Banco Popolare 12.979 0.714 1 N
Banco Popular Español S.A. 15.888 0.661 4 Y
Banco Sabadell S.A. 15.698 0.775 1 Y
Banco Santander S.A. 35.463 0.116 2 Y
Bank of Ireland 16.062 0.409 1 Y
Bankia 4.8388 0.430 1 N
Barclays Bank 18.109 0.820 3 Y
BBVA 27.591 3.647 4 Y
BNL 35.452 2.525 1 Y
BNP Paribas 27.320 0.776 4 Y
Commerzbank AG 19.007 0.406 2 Y
Crédit Agricole 26.209 0.921 2 Y
Crédit Mutuel CIC 17.081 0.277 2 Y
Credit Suisse 19.782 1.181 2 Y
Deutsche Bank AG 24.505 1.122 2 Y
Dexia Credit Local 16.578 1.853 5 Y
Erste Group Bank AG 20.094 0.782 2 Y
Fortis Bank SA 29.137 0.019 3 Y
HSBC Bank 12.408 0.359 2 N
ING Bank 5.896 0.667 2 N
Intesa San Paolo Spa 21.862 2.152 3 Y
Lloyds Bank 22.061 0.055 2 Y
Mediobanca Spa 23.775 1.202 2 Y
Natixis 22.841 1.670 2 Y
Nordea Bank AB 15.805 0.591 3 Y
Société Générale SA 47.236 1.939 4 Y
The Royal Bank of Scotland 17.696 0.385 3 Y
UBS 16.238 0.184 2 Y
Unicredit Spa 15.453 0.998 2 Y
Unione di Banche Italiane 17.857 2.258 2 Y
5% Critical Value (cointegrating rank) 15.41 3.76
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Table 2.4: Price Discovery Analysis, Vector Error Correction Models results – This table shows the result of the Vector Error
Correction Models for each bank. Column 2 and 3 report the value of the estimated error correction coefficients of the CDS
premiums and bond spreads, respectively. Column 4 shows the leading market
Bank λ1 λ2 Leading Mkt
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena Not Cointegrated
Banco Comercial Português Not Cointegrated
Banco Popolare Not Cointegrated
Banco Popular Español S.A. −0.00325 0.0128∗∗∗ CDS
Banco Sabadell S.A. 0.00448 0.0245∗∗∗ CDS
Banco Santander S.A. −0.0317∗∗∗ 0.0175∗∗∗ Bond
Bank of Ireland −0.0027 0.0737∗∗∗ CDS
Bankia Not Cointegrated
Barclays Bank −0.0351∗∗∗ 0.0105 Bond
BBVA −0.00687 0.0431∗∗∗ CDS
BNL −0.00981 0.0329∗∗∗ CDS
BNP Paribas −0.0185 0.0288∗∗∗ CDS
Commerzbank AG −0.0371∗∗∗ 0.00475 Bond
Crédit Agricole −0.0352∗∗∗ 0.0340∗∗∗ Bond
Crédit Mutuel CIC −0.0429∗∗∗ 0.00451 Bond
Credit Suisse −0.0278∗∗∗ 0.00226 Bond
Deutsche Bank AG −0.0366∗∗∗ 0.0198∗∗ Bond
Dexia Credit Local −0.0151∗∗∗ 0.0103 Bond
Erste Group Bank AG −0.00746 0.0209∗∗∗ CDS
Fortis Bank SA −0.0341∗∗∗ 0.0358∗∗∗ CDS
HSBC Bank Not Cointegrated
ING Bank Not Cointegrated
Intesa San Paolo Spa −0.0257∗∗ 0.0301∗∗∗ CDS
Lloyds Bank −0.0391∗∗∗ 0.0103 Bond
Mediobanca Spa −0.04554∗∗∗ 0.0030343 Bond
Natixis −0.0200∗∗∗ 0.000357 Bond
Nordea Bank AB −0.0162 0.0497∗∗∗ CDS
Société Générale SA −0.0144 0.108∗∗∗ CDS
The Royal Bank of Scotland −0.0349∗∗∗ 0.00907 Bond
UBS −0.0292∗∗∗ −0.00181 Bond
Unicredit Spa −0.0198∗∗∗ 0.0156∗∗ Bond
Unione di Banche Italiane −0.0147∗∗∗ 0.0595∗∗∗ CDS
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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This empirical result may have relevant implications in terms of financial stability. As
CDS contracts are not regulated as insurance, in periods of financial distress speculators
are free to satisfy their increasing incentives by buying naked CDSs. As a consequence,
a price discovery process that is structurally determined on the derivative market would
imply that trading activities in CDSs are systematically able to influence the borrowing
costs of financial institutions. This aspect assumes great importance when considering
the over-the-counter nature of the CDS market and its low levels of transparency and
regulation.
Previous studies which find similar evidence (e.g. Ammer and Cai, 2011, Delatte
et al., 2012 or Coudert and Gex, 2013) argue that when economic conditions deteriorate
speculation activities on the CDS market increase, resulting in strong inflows of liquidity
on the derivative market. As a consequence, sellers of protection issue a larger number
of CDS contracts which results in a switch of the leadership in price discovery process.
However, such studies do not provide empirical evidence for this argument.
Table 2.5: Price Discovery Analysis, Granger Causality Test Results – This table shows the result of the
Granger Causality Tests performed only for the non-cointegrated banks
Bank
H0: Bond spread
does not cause
CDS spread
H0: CDS spread
does not cause
Bond spread
Lead
Mkt
F-Stat p-value F-Stat p-value
Banca Monte dei Paschi
di Siena
1.94 0.1010 5.8193 0 CDS
Banco Comercial Por-
tuguês
1.42 0.2428 5.37 0.0048 CDS
Banco Popolare 4.203 0.0153 14.201 0 Both
Bankia 1.76 0.1731 5.0844 0.0065 CDS
HSBC Bank 2.32 0.0991 0.2181 0.8041 Bond
ING Bank 9.18 0.0001 2.05 0.1298 Bond
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Approximately half of our sample period is characterised by relative financial stabil-
ity and low volatility on credit markets. For this reason, we cannot link our findings only
to financial instability, as did in existing literature. We believe that further evidence, to
understand better the dynamics behind the PDP, may be found by exploring the behaviour
of credit risk’s determinants when the CDS market is in the lead. In order to take a step
further with respect to existing studies, in the next section we perform a second empirical
analysis to investigate whether the leading role of CDSs is, to some extent, reflected in
the behaviour of the determinants of banks’ credit risk.
2.3 Implications on credit risk determinants
The aim of this section is to analyse the determinants of banks’ credit risk, to assess
whether they provide further evidence of the leading role of credit default swaps.
To capture the impact of the leading role of the CDS market on credit risk’s determ-
inants, our sample of banks is separated into two sub-groups on the basis of the results
of the price discovery analysis carried in the previous section. The first group contains
those banks for which the bond market has the lead on CDSs; the second group contains
those banks for which the derivatives lead their underlying assets.
There is a significant literature that empirically analyses the factors that determine
credit risk using CDS spreads as a proxy, on different sample periods and different kind
of reference entities. For instance, Collin-Dufresn et al. (2001), Longstaff et al. (2005)
and Bedendo and Colla (2015) focus their analysis on corporate CDSs; Pan and Singleton
(2008), Longstaff et al. (2011) and Dieckmann and Plank (2012) use sovereign CDSs;
Annaert et al. (2013) are among the few who study the determinants of CDSs written on
banks. Those studies decompose the explained part of CDS spreads changes according
to various risk determinants.
In this section we follow and complement the methodology used by the above papers.
One of the main limits identified in the existing literature is the inability of the empirical
specification to capture the liquidity position of the entities under analysis, as it is hard
to find adequate proxies for liquidity. We propose a solution to this issue by including,
among the regressors, data on the banks’ recourse to central bank liquidity. The main
feature of this data is that they proxy short and medium term liquidity needs of a bank.
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2.3.1 Explanatory variables
To perform this analysis, we include in our specification bank’s specific variables, that
potentially affect directly the credit risk of a bank, and global variables, that capture
market conditions and systemic risk. Table 2.6 lists the variables used in this analysis.
Table 2.6: Control Variables – This table lists the variables used in the model specification, their descrip-
tions, the type, and their sources
Variable Description Type Source
Sovereign CDS Log-change in the (bank’s
home-country) sovereign
credit default swap spreads
Global/Country Datastream
Stoxx Glob 18 Change in the STOXX Global
1800 index
Global Bloomberg
Systemic Risk Change in the Systemic Risk
Indicator
Global ECB Statistical
Data Warehouse
Risk Free Change in the 5-year German
bund
Global Datastream
Exchange rate Change in the USD-EUR
exchange rate
Global Bloomberg
Stock Return Log-change in the stock price Bank Specific Datastream
MRO Change in the recourse to
MROs
Bank Specific ECB
Confidential
LTRO Change in the recourse to
LTROs
Bank Specific ECB
Confidential
Global and risk factors
As in Annaert et al. (2013), we take into consideration variables that reflect global equity
and fixed income markets conditions. In order to capture the business climate, we use the
Stoxx Global 1800 index returns and we expect a negative relation between this index
and credit spreads: the improvement in global markets’ climate decreases default prob-
abilities. A second global factor taken into consideration is the risk free rate. Since we
use the five-year CDS spread as dependent variable, we measure the risk-free rate using
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the 5 year German spot rate.3 In the Merton (1974) model, the riskless interest rate con-
stitutes the drift in the risk neutral world. The higher it is, the less likely default becomes.
This can also be explained in macroeconomic terms: an increase in the risk free interest
rate can be linked to economic growth and to improvements in macroeconomic condi-
tions, hence it should reduce default probabilities. For this reason, a negative relationship
with credit spreads is expected. In addition, currency market variations are captured by
including changes in the US Dollar-Euro exchange rate.
One innovation of our analysis is to include, in our specification, a variable that
captures global risk. Specifically, we include the Systemic Risk Measure produced by
the European Central Bank. The ECB defines this indicator as measurement of joint
default risk of Euro area large and complex banking groups (ECB, 2012). This variable
is expected to have a positive relationship with credit spreads.
Finally, among the global factors, we include the sovereign risk of the bank’s home
country. Given the key role that banks play in the actual structure of the financial system
and the efforts made by governments during the crisis to avoid default of big financial
institution, we believe that sovereign risks play a key role among the determinants of
banks’ credit spreads. This is confirmed by the conclusion of Avino and Cotter (2014), in
which the existence of high interconnections between banks and sovereigns credit default
swaps is shown. Also in this case, a positive relationship between the two variables is
expected.
Idiosyncratic factors
The first idiosyncratic variable used to explain credit risk is the stock return. Stock prices
evolution reflect profitability and, at the same time, future prospects of a bank. Positive
stock returns reflect better overall expectations, thus we expect a negative relationship
between returns and credit spreads.
Another innovation of this analysis is that we include, in the specification, the re-
course to central bank liquidity. We believe that changes in the recourse operations with
the central bank could be considered as an adequate proxy of the internal liquidity po-
sition of a bank. In fact, under a situation of liquidity drain, a bank will increase its
3We also use 1-year and 10-year rates for robustness checks, obtaining similar results
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recourse to central bank operations. Specifically, we include the following ECB liquidity
providing operations: main refinancing operations (MROs), lending operations carried
by the Eurosystem with a maturity of seven days, and longer term refinancing operations
(LTROs), lending operations with a maturity above three months.4 We expect a positive
relationship between credit spreads and these two variables. One important characteristic
of this data is that the European Central Bank treats it as confidential and, as such, it is
not available to the public.
Our sample of banks includes also institutions that have their headquarters outside
the Eurozone. However, all the banks in our sample have access, directly or indirectly,
to Eurosystem refinancing operations. In order to make our analysis as consistent as
possible, we use refinancing operation data at group level on an aggregate basis for those
banks which operate in the Eurozone only through subsidiaries.
2.3.2 Empirical analysis and results
Estimation Technique
Given the selection of variables we estimate the following ordinary least squares regres-
sion:
∆ log(CDSit) =αi + γ∆ log(StockPit)
+ λ∆Oit + η∆Xt + β∆ log(SovCDSjt) + εit
, (2.4)
in which i is the subscript identifying the bank, t indicates the time period, and j indic-
ates the residence country of the bank. ∆ log(CDSit) is the log change in CDS spread;
∆ log(StockPit) is the log change in the stock price; ∆Oit is the change in the outstand-
ing refinancing credit within the ECB; ∆Xt is the change in the global factors which
captures any fixed effects across time; while αi is bank’s i fixed effect. However, in the
result reported, we will restrict the intercept term to be constant across banks, since the
F-test does not reject this restriction at any significance level.
Like in the previous section, the data span from the period starting from 1 January
4We do not make any distinction between standard and non-standard LTROs. As a consequence, this
variable includes: standard three months LTROs, regularly carried by the ECB, and the non-standard three
years LTROs launched by the ECB in December 2011 and February 2012.
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2011 to 31 December 2013. Due to a different frequency of some of the explanatory
variables, in this section we use monthly instead of daily data. This results in 1112
(unbalanced) panel observations.
Regression results
Explorative univariate regressions (not reported) show that all variables included in our
specification are empirically linked to banks’ CDS spread changes.
The results are presented in Table 2.7 and are in line with our conjectures and with
existing literature. The first column presents the outcome of our estimates for the full
sample of banks. Over the sample period, explanatory variables are able to explain up to
66% of the variation in CDS spread changes. All global and idiosyncratic factors carry
the right sign and are statistically significant. As in Bedendo and Colla (2015) we find
empirical evidence of spillover effects of risk form sovereign to sample entities. Increase
in sovereign risk explains positive variations of banks’ credit risk. The estimated effects
of stock returns, risk free return and market return are consistent with Annaert et al.
(2013): we find that an increase in all these variables has a negative effect on credit
default swap spreads variations.
Considering the explanatory variables that have been used for the first time by this
study, the results of the regressions are consistent with our expectations. The relationship
between credit spreads and the Systemic Risk Indicator is positive and significant. The
ECB providing operations coefficients (for both MROs and LTROs) are significant and
positive. We find empirical evidence that changes in the recourse to refinancing opera-
tions have a positive effect on CDS spreads. This effect is stronger for the recourse to
liquidity with shorter maturity. Consistent with our initial conjectures, more frequent ac-
cess to refinancing operations reflects worsening credit condition perceptions, especially
in the short term.
The main objective of this second analysis is to investigate whether the leading role
of credit default swaps is also linked to a different impact of risk determinants on banks’
credit risk. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2.7 present the empirical results for the banks
grouped on the basis of the price discovery analysis carried in Section 2.2.
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Table 2.7: Credit Risk Determinants Analysis Results – This table shows the results of pooled regressions
(no fixed effects), robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Column (I) represents the result for the
full sample of banks; column (II) shows the results for the first group of banks, for which the bond market
has the leading role in price discovery process; column (III) shows the results for the second group of banks,
for which the CDS market has the leading role in price discovery process
Variable (I) (II) (III)
Sovereign CDS
0.1963∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.2983∗∗∗
(0.0234) (0.0327) (0.0339)
Stock Return
−0.0540∗∗ −0.0473 −0.0516∗
(0.0212) (0.0330) (0.0276)
MRO
0.005∗∗ 0.0075∗ 0.0041∗
(0.002) (0.0039) (0.0023)
LTRO
0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0039∗∗ 0.0034∗∗
(0.0011) (0.0018) (.00013)
Stoxx Glob 18
−0.0013∗∗∗ −0.0013∗∗ −0.0013∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Systemic Risk
0.0354∗∗∗ 0.0381∗∗∗ 0.0317∗∗∗
(0.0022) (0.0028) (0.0032)
Risk Free
−0.0648∗∗∗ −0.0591∗∗∗ −0.0681∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0205) (0.0206)
Exchange Rate
−0.4250∗∗ −0.4680∗∗ −0.3510
(0.1688) (0.2111) (0.2681)
N 1112 595 517
R2 0.661 0.636 0.698
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Regressions results for the first group of banks are similar to those obtained for the
whole sample. All the variables have the same signs; nevertheless, the coefficient of
stock returns loses its significance. Similar conclusions can be drawn for the second
group of banks. However, in this case, it is the coefficient of exchange rate that loses
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the significance. For both regressions we obtain adjusted R-squared similar to the one
obtained for the full sample.
The main empirical difference between the two groups concerns the magnitude of
the impact of sovereign risk on banks’ credit spreads. When the CDS market has the
lead in price discovery, the estimated coefficient of the changes in sovereign CDSs is
more than twice of the same coefficient when the bond market is in the lead. Precisely,
our estimates indicate that a 1% increase in sovereign spreads translates into an increase
in bank spreads of 0.11% for the first group, and an increase of 0.3% for the second
group. The difference between the two estimates is statistically different than zero. This
suggests a different risk transfer mechanism from sovereign to financial entities when
prices of banks’ bonds are led by credit default swaps. Specifically, the different impact
of sovereign risk on CDS spreads is stronger for those banks for which the credit default
swaps market has the leading role in price discovery process.
This asymmetric impact of sovereign risk within the two groups, also in the light
of the findings of existing studies, could suggest the existence of a threat to financial
stability posed by CDS trading. As seen in the previous section, existing studies argue
that speculation in CDS can affects the prices of sovereign bonds. If this is the case
and, at the same time, (i) the CDS market is able to lead prices of bonds issued by some
banks and (ii) the sovereign risk has a stronger impact on the credit risk of these banks,
then speculation activities in CDS, on sovereign and financial entities, could trigger a
dangerous vicious circle. A circle which could exacerbate financial distress and possibly
lead, in an extreme scenario, to the default of financial institutions.
Robustness check
In order to check the robustness of the stronger impact of sovereign risk on CDS spreads
changes when the derivative has a leading role in price discovery, we perform two robust-
ness tests that examine different samples of the data or use alternative data definitions.
Table 2.8 reports the results of the tests.
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Table 2.8: Credit Risk Determinants Robustneess check – This table shows the results of pooled regressions
(no fixed effects), robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Column (I) and (II) represent the result
of the regressions with the addition of the change in the MSCI country indices. Column (I) represent the
first group of banks; column (II) the second group of banks. Column (III) and (IV) represent the results of
the regressions excluding the period of financial distress. Column (III) represent the first group of banks;
column (IV) the second group of banks
Variable (I) (II) (III) (IV)
Sovereign CDS
0.0925∗∗∗ 0.2481∗∗∗ 0.0628∗ 0.1516∗∗∗
(0.0319) (0.0323) (0.0370) (0.0482)
Stock Return
−0.0135 −0.0359 0.0146 −0.0326
(0.0308) (0.0286) (0.0401) (0.0374)
MRO
0.0084∗∗ 0.0040∗ 0.0042 0.0071∗
(0.0040) (0.0022) (0.0074) (0.0042)
LTRO
0.0035∗∗ 0.0031∗∗ −0.0002 0.0054∗
(0.0015) (0.0012) (0.0021) (0.0030)
Stoxx Glob 18
0.0015∗∗ 0.0001 −0.0032∗∗∗ −0.0041∗∗∗
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0010)
Systemic Risk
0.0312∗∗∗ 0.0263∗∗∗ 0.0618∗∗∗ 0.0513∗∗∗
(0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0038) (0.0049)
Risk Free
−0.0539∗∗∗ −0.0599∗∗∗ −0.0761∗∗∗ −0.1196∗∗∗
(0.0188) (0.0199) (0.0222) (0.0268)
Exchange Rate
−0.1397 −0.2046 −0.1537 −0.0440
(0.2040) (0.2514) (0.2551) (0.3550)
MSCI Country
−0.0007∗∗∗ −0.0008∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002)
N 595 517 323 285
R2 0.665 0.715 0.606 0.553
∗p < 0.1; ∗∗p < 0.05; ∗∗∗p < 0.01
One possible concern relates to the characteristics of the sovereign CDSs and to the
fact that the country of residence may influence the outcome of the estimates. In order to
54
2.4. Conclusion
check the robustness against this, we include, as additional variable, the changes in the
MSCI index of a bank’s home country. This variable, which measure the stock market
performance in a given region, allows us to control for country specific characteristics
that may influence banks’ credit risk, but are not captured by the home country sovereign
risk. The results, reported in columns 1 and 2, show that coefficients on sovereign CDSs
are essentially unchanged and remain highly statistically significant, for both groups of
banks.
A second concern is that the results might be affected by the sovereign debt crisis.
Thus, we estimate the regression only after mid-2012. The results, presented in columns
3 and 4, remain qualitatively unchanged.
2.4 Conclusion
In this work we assess the price discovery process between bonds and CDSs written on
European banks, and we explore the implications of a leading role of the CDS market on
banks’ credit risk determinants.
Whereas there is substantial literature on bond-CDS price discovery, empirical stud-
ies focusing on the banking sector are scarce and, to the best of our knowledge, there is
no literature that empirically explores the implications of a leading role of the derivative
market.
We concentrate our analysis on a sample of 32 European banks, over the period
between 2011 and 2013. Our main findings can be summarised as follows: (i) for 15
banks, the CDS market has the leading role in price discovery process on the underlying
bond market; (ii) for this subgroup of banks, when analysing the determinants of credit
risk, a stronger impact of sovereign risk on banks’ credit risk is observed.
Our findings suggest that trading activities in CDSs can influence the financing cost of
some banks. As pointed out by previous studies, this empirical evidence can be driven by
multiple reasons, such as global conditions of the financial system, idiosyncratic charac-
teristics of a bank, or specific features of CDS contracts. Our study, in contrast to existing
literature, explores the implications of this evidence on credit risk’s determinants.
We show that, when the derivative market has the leading role in price discovery, the
home country sovereign risk has a significantly stronger impact on banks’ CDS spreads,
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while all other risk determinants do not change their magnitude.
Our results, when read together with the conclusions of previous studies on sovereign
CDSs price discovery process, could indicate the risk of a dangerous vicious circle which
might have its inception in CDSs trading. If CDSs are able to influence the financing
cost of some banks and, at the same time, the sovereign risk has stronger impact on their
credit risk, then it may be the case that trading in CDS could put financial institutions
under serious distress not necessary driven by worsening fundamentals. This may occur
in particular if the price discovery process takes place on the derivative market also for
sovereign entities, as empirically shown by existing literature.
Our study does not provide evidence on the mechanism of the overall phenomenon,
nor can our results be generalised to other contexts or periods. We cannot neither con-
clude that CDSs lead underlying bonds because of the stronger transaction mechanism
or, to the contrary, that the stronger effect of sovereign risk on banks’ credit risk is due to
the price discovery process. Nevertheless, our study provides further empirical evidence
of a potential market weakness that may have several implications on the credit risk of
financial entities. Given the potential harmful implications of this evidence, we believe
that further analysis is needed to understand whether naked CDSs are the reason behind
the leading role of the derivative market.
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Chapter 3. Optimal portfolios with credit default swaps
3.1 Introduction
During the past 15 years, the market of credit default swaps (CDSs) has become one
of the largest segments of derivatives markets, reaching its peak at the beginning of the
global financial crisis. At the end of June 2008, the total notional amount of outstanding
CDS contracts was USD 57.325 trillion.1
CDSs are bilateral derivative contracts under which an investor can buy protection
against the credit risk of a reference entity by paying a periodic premium to the seller.
This feature makes CDS functionally equivalent to insurance contracts. However, the
main difference with respect to an insurance contract is the possibility of buying a CDS
without owning the underlying asset (i.e. buying the derivative in the so-called uncovered
or “naked” form).
The strong growth of the market and the possibility of buying uncovered CDSs has
raised concerns regarding their use. One of the main arguments is that speculation on
CDSs exacerbated the recent European sovereign crisis, driving CDS premia of some
(distressed) countries to record highs and, consequently, influencing their cost of funding
(Haugh et al., 2009, Sgherri and Zoli, 2009 and Fontana and Scheicher, 2016).
The main practical consequence of these concerns has been the adoption, by the
European Council, of a regulation aiming to ban any person or legal entity in the EU
from entering into naked, or uncovered, CDS on sovereign debt. The regulation entered
into force in November 2012.2 The main objective of this intervention was to reduce
the magnitude of speculation on sovereign CDSs. However, a number of weaknesses
have been highlighted. Juurikkala (2012), for instance, lists three issues that threaten
the effectiveness of the ban: (i) the over-the-counter nature of CDS contracts; (ii) the
worldwide framework of financial markets; and (iii) the absence of a similar rule in the
US.
In this work, we study the optimal asset allocation for an agent who wants to max-
imise the expected utility of his or her final wealth by investing in a riskless asset, a (de-
faultable) bond and a CDS written on the bond. This study aims to understand whether
1Bank for International Settlements, OTC derivatives market activity in the first half of 2008, available
at: http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy0811.pdf.
2Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on
short selling and certain aspects of CDSs.
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it is optimal for such an agent to invest in CDSs.
Investment decisions in the presence of CDSs are closely related to portfolio choices
with mortality contingent claims. Actually, the default process of a firm can be modelled
as the force of mortality of an individual or a population. There is extensive literature
that explores this subject and successfully models the force of mortality by making use
of well-known results about stochastic processes (see, e.g., Dahl, 2004; Biffis, 2005;
Menoncin, 2008; Menoncin, 2009). However, literature on optimal investment choices
with CDSs is scarce.
In this study we use a framework similar to that presented in Menoncin and Regis
(2015), but we apply it to the case of an investment in CDS. We provide a closed-form
solution to the problem of an agent endowed with a general hyperbolic absolute risk
aversion (HARA) class of preferences. In addition, we calibrate the model on market
data of six European countries, to assess the behaviour of an investor exposed to different
degrees of sovereign risk. In this way, the investment strategy can be considered that of
a financial institution that can sell or buy credit risk protection on a sovereign entity.
The results of the calibration show that (i) it is optimal to invest in CDSs and, spe-
cifically, to sell credit protection instead of buying it, and (ii) speculation in CDSs plays
a crucial role in investment strategy. In the calibrated optimal portfolio, the investor al-
ways issues more CDSs than the bonds held in the portfolio. In addition, the magnitude of
speculation is directly linked with the underlying risk of the reference entity: the higher
is the sovereign risk, the stronger is the speculation. This result is robust to changes in
the investor’s risk aversion.
Few studies empirically analyse the role of CDS trading on the European sovereign
market and their conclusions are, to some extent, related to the results of our calibrated
model. For instance, Delatte et al. (2012) highlight the link between the underlying risk
of the reference entity and the magnitude of the speculation in CDSs. In assessing the
potential influence of the growing CDS market on the borrowing cost of sovereign states
during the European sovereign crisis, the authors conclude that speculation is a signi-
ficant driver of activity in the CDS market during distress periods. A second empirical
study that considers the role of speculation on the CDS market is Chiarella et al. (2015).
In that study, a heterogeneous agent model is estimated to address whether the recent
movements in European sovereign credit spreads are driven by weakened fundament-
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als or momentum trading behaviour. The authors conclude that, for troubled peripheral
European countries, momentum or non-fundamental trading played a dominant role in
increasing their sovereign CDS spreads beyond the levels justified by weakening funda-
mentals.
In our calibrated model, one consequence of the speculation strategy of the investor
is an increase in liquidity on the CDS market. The market becomes more liquid as the in-
vestor optimally issues more and more CDSs. The role of liquidity has been investigated
by a number of studies. For instance, Badaoui et al. (2013) argue that the surge in CDS
spreads observed during the sovereign crisis was mainly due to a rise in market liquid-
ity rather than an increase in default intensity. Aizenman et al. (2013) and Dewachter
et al. (2015) analyse the role of macroeconomic fundamentals on CDS spreads in the
Euro area. Both studies show how fundamentals are not able to fully explain changes
in the sovereign risk of peripheral countries and show that liquidity effects and market
overreaction play a dominant role during distress periods. Similarly, in assessing the
sovereign credit and liquidity spread interactions over the recent periods of crisis, Calice
et al. (2013) find that for several countries, including Greece, Ireland, and Portugal, the
liquidity of the sovereign CDS market had a relevant influence on sovereign bond credit
spreads. The authors argue that a sovereign debt market failure for several Eurozone
countries was prevented by coordinated EU action.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the model set-up,
while in Section 3.3, investors’ preferences are described and the portfolio optimisation
problem is solved in closed form. In Section 3.4, a calibration of the model, based on
data of six European countries, is presented. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 The model set-up
3.2.1 State variables
On a continuously open and frictionless financial market over the time set [t0,+∞[, the
economic framework is described by a set of s state variables z (t) ∈ Rs which solve the
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following (matrix) stochastic differential equation:
dz (t)
s×1
= µz (t, z)
s×1
dt+ Ω (t, z)′
s×n
dW (t)
n×1
, (3.1)
where z (t0) is a deterministic vector that defines the initial state of the system, W (t) is
a vector of n independent Wiener processes,3 and the prime denotes transposition. The
usual properties for guaranteeing the existence of a strong solution to equation (3.1) are
assumed to hold.
3.2.2 Financial market
In the financial market n risky assets are traded. Their prices S (t) ∈ Rn+ solve the
(matrix) stochastic differential equation
I−1S
n×1
dS (t)
n×1
= µ (t, z)
n×1
dt+ Σ (t, z)′
n×n
dW (t)
n×1
, (3.2)
where IS is a diagonal matrix containing the elements of vector S (t). The initial asset
prices S (t0) are deterministic. Finally, a riskless asset exists, whose price G (t) ∈ R+
solves the ordinary differential equation
G (t)−1 dG (t) = r (t, z) dt, (3.3)
where r (t, z) ∈ R+ is the instantaneously riskless interest rate. We assume G (t0) = 1,
i.e. the riskless asset is the numéraire of the economy. The financial market is assumed
to be arbitrage free and complete. In other words, a unique vector of market prices of risk
ξ (t, z) ∈ Rn exists, such that Σ (t, z)′ ξ (t, z) = µ (t, z)− r (t, z)1, where 1 is a vector
of ones (i.e. ∃! Σ (t, z)−1).
Girsanov’s theorem allows us to switch from the historical (P) to the risk-neutral
probability Q by using dWQ (t) = ξ (t, z) dt+ dW (t). The value in t0 of any cash flow
3The case with dependent Wiener processes can be easily obtained through Cholesky’s decomposition.
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Ξ (t) available at time t can be written as
Ξ (t0) = EQt0
[
Ξ (t)
G (t0)
G (t)
]
= EQt0
[
Ξ (t) e
− ´ tt0 r(u,z)du
]
= Et0
[
Ξ (t)m (t0, t) e
− ´ tt0 r(u,z)du
]
,
where Et0 [•] and EQt0 [•] are the expected value operators under the historical (P) and
the risk neutral (Q) probabilities respectively, conditional on the information set at time
t0, and the martingale m (t0, t), such that m (t0, t0) = 1, solves m (t0, t)
−1 dm (t0, t) =
−ξ (t, z) dW (t).
3.2.3 Credit risk market
Among the risky assets, whose prices are gathered in vector S (t) in equation (3.2), we
assume there is a derivative written on the credit risk of an underlying asset. This credit
risk is measured by a default intensity λ (t, z), which is one of the state variables, whose
values are gathered in z (t). It is easy to demonstrate (e.g. Duffie and Singleton, 2003)
that the value in t0 of an asset paying Ξ (t) monetary units in t and whose issuer may go
bankrupt with intensity λ (t, z) is given by
EQt0
[
Ξ (t) e
− ´ tt0 r(u,z)+λ(u,z)du
]
,
where EQt0 [•] is the expected value under so-called risk neutral probability, given the
information set available at time t0. Furthermore, the value of cash flow available at the
default time τ (we call this Ξ (τ)) is given by
EQt0
[ˆ ∞
t0
Ξ (s)λ (s) e
− ´ st0 r(u,z)+λ(u,z)duds
]
,
where we assume that the default time is defined on the interval [t0,+∞[ (see Lando,
1998).
In this study, we analyse the case of a CDS written on a bond. The CDS is a de-
rivative in which the protection buyer pays a spread at fixed dates, while the protection
seller engages to pay the loss given default (LGD) on a certain reference entity if it goes
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bankrupt before the expiration of the derivative. The value of the CDS is presented in
Subsection 4.1.1.
3.3 Investor’s maximisation problem
3.3.1 Investor’s wealth
The investor holds θS (t) ∈ Rn units of the risky assets and θG (t) ∈ R units of the
riskless asset. Thus, at any instant in time, the total value of the investor’s assets (i.e. his
or her financial wealth) R (t) is given by the static budget constraint
R (t) = θS (t)
′ S (t) + θG (t)G (t) , (3.4)
whose differential is the dynamic budget constraint
dR (t) = θS (t)
′ dS (t)+θG (t) dG (t)+dθS (t)′ (S (t) + dS (t)) + dθG (t)G (t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
dRa(t)
. (3.5)
The first two components on the right hand side of equation (3.5) account for the changes
in prices. The dRa (t) component, which accounts for the dynamic adjustment of the
portfolio allocation, must take into account the intensity of default between t and t+ dt,
which is given by λ (t, z) dt. Thus, the investor’s wealth dynamics are
dR (t) = θS (t)
′ dS (t) + θG (t) dG (t) + λ (t, z)R (t) dt. (3.6)
Once the static budget constraint (3.4) and the asset differentials (3.2) and (3.3) are
suitably taken into account, dR(t) becomes
dR (t) =
(
R (t) (r (t, z) + λ (t, z)) + θS (t)
′ IS (µ (t, z)− r (t, z) 1)
)
dt (3.7)
+θS (t)
′ ISΣ (t, z)′ dW (t) .
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3.3.2 Investor’s preferences and objective
The investor obtains utility from the wealth at the end of the financial horizon
UR (R (T )) =
(R (T )−Rm)1−δ
1− δ ,
where δ > 1 and the constantRm can be interpreted as the minimum subsistence value of
final wealth. This utility belongs to the HARA family. In fact, the Arrow-Pratt absolute
risk aversion index is δ/ (R (T )−Rm). Accordingly, the higher Rm, the higher the
risk aversion: an agent who has to guarantee a higher minimum level of final wealth
will choose a safer investment. The case of constant relative risk aversion preferences is
obtained with Rm = 0.
The investor chooses θS (t) which maximises the expected utility of final wealth if
the credit event has not occurred yet:
max
θS(t)
Et0
[
(R (T )−Rm)1−δ
1− δ e
− ´ Tt0 ρ(u,z)+λ(u,z)du
]
, (3.8)
where ρ (t, z) is a possibly stochastic subjective discount rate. The budget constraint
equalises the initial wealth to the expected present value of the final wealth under the risk
neutral probability:
R (t0) = EQt0
[
R (T ) e
− ´ Tt0 r(u,z)+λ(u,z)du
]
. (3.9)
3.3.3 The optimal portfolio
Problem (3.8) under the constraint (3.9) can be solved either through dynamic program-
ming (via the so-called Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation) or through the so-called mar-
tingale approach. This latter method is viable in our framework because of market com-
pleteness.
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Proposition 1. The optimal portfolio-solving problem (3.8) is
ISθ
∗
S (t) =
R (t)−H (t, z)
δ
Σ (t, z)−1 ξ (t, z) (3.10)
+
R (t)−H (t, z)
F (t, z)
Σ (t, z)−1 Ω (t, z)
∂F (t, z)
∂z
+Σ (t, z)−1 Ω (t, z)
∂H (t, z)
∂z
,
where
H (t, z) = EQt
[
Rme
− ´ Tt0 r(u,z)+λ(u,z)du
]
, (3.11)
F (t, z) = EQδt
[
e−
´ T
t (
δ−1
δ
r(u,z)+ 1
δ
ρ(u,z)+λ(u,z)+ 1
2
1
δ
δ−1
δ
ξ(u,z)′ξ(u,z))du
]
, (3.12)
dW (t)Qδ =
δ − 1
δ
ξ (t, z) dt+ dW (t) . (3.13)
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.
In the solution, we used the new probability measure Qδ defined in equation (3.13).
It has two relevant properties: (i) for a log-utility agent, that is δ = 1, the probability Qδ
coincides with the historical probability; (ii) when the agent is infinitely risk averse, that
is δ → +∞, the probability Qδ coincides with Q. In fact, we can think of the Wiener
processes under Qδ as a weighted mean of the Wiener processes under the risk neutral
and the historical probabilities:
dW (t)Qδ =
(
1− 1
δ
)
dW (t)Q +
1
δ
dW (t) . (3.14)
Some important properties of the optimal portfolio are worth highlighting.
• The function H (t, z) is the expected value, under Q, of the minimum final wealth
Rm appropriately discounted for both financial and credit risk.
• The function F (t, z) is the expected value (under the preference-adjusted measure
Qδ) of discount factors taking into account both the financial risk and the credit
risk and, thus, it can be thought of as a “global” discount factor.
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• We remark that the difference R (t) − H (t, z) is relevant for computing the op-
timal portfolio, which depends also on the sensitivities ofH (t, z) and F (t, z) with
respect to the state variables z.
• We identify three components in the demand for the risky assets: (i) a speculat-
ive component, related to the risk premium ξ, (ii) a hedging component against
the fluctuations of the global discount factor F (t, z), and (iii) a hedging compon-
ent against the fluctuations of the expected imbalance to finance minimum wealth
H (t, z).
• The last two components depend on: (i) the risk aversion of the individual, (ii)
the variance-covariance matrix of the state variables, and (iii) the sensitivities of
F (t, z) and H (t, z) with respect to changes in the state variables.
3.4 A portfolio with bond and CDS
3.4.1 Two state variable – Two asset case
We take into account a framework with two independent state variables[
dz1 (t)
dz2 (t)
]
=
[
µz1
µz2
]
dt+
[
ω1 0
0 ω2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ω′
[
dW1 (t)
dW2 (t)
]
,
and two financial assets which are derivatives on these variables:[
dS1(t)
S1(t)
dS2(t)
S2(t)
]
=
[
µ1
µ2
]
dt+
[
ηS1,z1ω1 ηS1,z2ω2
ηS2,z1ω1 ηS2,z2ω2
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Σ′
[
dW1 (t)
dW2 (t)
]
.
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where ηSi,zj ≡ ∂Si∂zj 1Si are the semi-elasticities. Thus,
Σ−1 =
[
ηS1,z1ω1 ηS2,z1ω1
ηS1,z2ω2 ηS2,z2ω2
]−1
=
1
(ηS1,z1ηS2,z2 − ηS1,z2ηS2,z1)ω1ω2
×
[
ηS2,z2ω2 −ηS2,z1ω1
−ηS1,z2ω2 ηS1,z1ω1
]
,
Σ−1Ω =
1
ηS1,z1ηS2,z2 − ηS1,z2ηS2,z1
[
ηS2,z2 −ηS2,z1
−ηS1,z2 ηS1,z1
]
.
Finally, with ξ =
[
ξ1 ξ2
]′
, the optimal portfolio is given by
[
S1θS1
S2θS2
]
=
R (t)−H (t, z)
δ (ηS1,z1ηS2,z2 − ηS1,z2ηS2,z1)ω1ω2
[
ηS2,z2ω2ξ1 − ηS2,z1ω1ξ2
−ηS1,z2ω2ξ1 + ηS1,z1ω1ξ2
]
(3.15)
+
R (t)−H (t, z)
ηS1,z1ηS2,z2 − ηS1,z2ηS2,z1
[
ηS2,z2ηF,z1 − ηS2,z1ηF,z2
−ηS1,z2ηF,z1 + ηS1,z1ηF,z2
]
+
H (t, z)
ηS1,z1ηS2,z2 − ηS1,z2ηS2,z1
[
ηS2,z2ηH,z1 − ηS2,z1ηH,z2
−ηS1,z2ηH,z1 + ηS1,z1ηH,z2
]
.
3.4.2 The state variables
We take into account a setting where there are two state variables: the instantaneously
riskless interest rate r (t) and the default intensity λ (t) (i.e. z (t) =
[
r (t) λ (t)
]′
).
Furthermore, the two state variables are assumed to be independent and follow a mean
reverting square root process:[
dr (t)
dλ (t)
]
=
[
ar (br − r (t))
aλ (bλ − λ (t))
]
dt+
[
σr
√
r (t) 0
0 σλ
√
λ (t)
][
dWr (t)
dWλ (t)
]
,
(3.16)
where r (t0) and λ (t0) are both known and for i ∈ {r, λ}, ai > 0 is the (constant)
strength of the mean reversion effect, bi > 0 is the (constant) long term mean which the
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process reverts towards. Here, we assume that 2aibi ≥ σ2i so that both r (t) and λ (t) are
always positive.
In this section we will use the following result.
Proposition 2. If the stochastic variable X (t) follows the process
dX (t) = a (b−X (t)) dt+ σ
√
X (t)dW (t) ,
X (t0) = X0,
then
V (t, T ) = Et
[
(1− χ+ χX (T )) e−
´ T
t X(s)ds
]
(3.17)
=
1− χ+ χab ´ Tt e−
´ T
s (a+C(u;a,σ,T )σ
2)duds+ χe−
´ T
t (a+C(u;a,σ,T )σ
2)duX (t)
eab
´ T
t C(u;a,σ,T )du+C(t;a,σ,T )X(t)
,
where
C (t; a, σ, T ) = 2
1− e−
√
a2+2σ2(T−t)
√
a2 + 2σ2 + a+
(√
a2 + 2σ2 − a
)
e−
√
a2+2σ2(T−t)
. (3.18)
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.
In order to keep the statistical properties of (3.16) unchanged when switching between
probabilities (either Q or Qδ), we assume that the market prices of risk for Wr (t) and
Wλ (t) are given by
ξr (t) = φr
√
r (t), ξλ (t) = φλ
√
λ (t),
where φr and φλ are constant. Under these assumptions, (3.16) can be rewritten under
both Q and Qδ just by changing the mean reverting strength and the long term mean as
follows (with i ∈ {r, λ})
aQi ≡ ai + σiφi, bQi ≡
aibi
ai + σiφi
,
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aQδi ≡ ai + σi
δ − 1
δ
φi, b
Qδ
i ≡
aibi
ai + σi
δ−1
δ φi
.
Given these results, the function H (t, z) in (3.11) can be simplified as follows:
H (t, z) = RmEQt
[
e
− ´ Tt0 r(u,z)du
]
EQt
[
e
− ´ Tt0 λ(u,z)du
]
= Rme
−aQr bQr
´ T
t C(u;a
Q
r ,σr,T)du−C(t;aQr ,σr,T)r(t)
×e−aQλbQλ
´ T
t C(u;a
Q
λ ,σλ,T)du−C(t;aQλ ,σλ,T)λ(t),
and, accordingly, the vector ∂H(t,z)∂z(t) has the following form:
∂H (t, z)
∂z (t)
=
 −∂H(t,z)∂r(t) C (t; aQr , σr, T )
−∂H(t,z)∂λ(t) C
(
t; aQλ , σλ, T
)  .
In the same way, the function F (t, z) in (3.12) can be written as
F (t, z) =e−
ρ
δ
(T−t)EQδt
[
e−
δ−1
δ (1+
1
2
1
δ
φ2r)
´ T
t r(u)du
]
EQδt
[
e−(1+
1
2
1
δ
δ−1
δ
φ2λ)
´ T
t λ(u)du
]
=e−
ρ
δ
(T−t)e−
δ−1
δ (1+
1
2
1
δ
φ2r)a
Qδ
r b
Qδ
r
´ T
t C
(
u; δ−1
δ (1+
1
2
1
δ
φ2r)a
Qδ
r ,
δ−1
δ (1+
1
2
1
δ
φ2r)σr,T
)
du
× e−C
(
t; δ−1
δ (1+
1
2
1
δ
φ2r)a
Qδ
r ,
δ−1
δ (1+
1
2
1
δ
φ2r)σr,T
)
r(t)
× e−(1+
1
2
1
δ
δ−1
δ
φ2λ)a
Qδ
λ b
Qδ
λ
´ T
t C
(
u;(1+ 12
1
δ
δ−1
δ
φ2λ)a
Qδ
λ ,(1+
1
2
1
δ
δ−1
δ
φ2λ)σλ,T
)
du
× e−C
(
t;(1+ 12
1
δ
δ−1
δ
φ2λ)a
Qδ
λ ,(1+
1
2
1
δ
δ−1
δ
φ2λ)σλ,T
)
λ(t)
,
from which the value of the partial derivatives ∂F (t,z)∂z(t)
1
F (t,z) as follows:
ηF,r =
∂F (t, z)
∂r (t)
1
F (t, z)
= −C
(
t;
δ − 1
δ
(
1 +
1
2
1
δ
φ2r
)
aQδr ,
δ − 1
δ
(
1 +
1
2
1
δ
φ2r
)
σr, T
)
,
ηF,λ =
∂F (t, z)
∂λ (t)
1
F (t, z)
= −C
(
t;
(
1 +
1
2
1
δ
δ − 1
δ
φ2λ
)
aQδλ ,
(
1 +
1
2
1
δ
δ − 1
δ
φ2λ
)
σλ, T
)
.
In the following subsection, we define the prices of the assets listed in the financial
market.
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3.4.3 Financial assets
On the financial market three assets are listed:
• the riskless asset whose price G (t) solves (3.3);
• a defaultable constant time-to-maturity (TB) bond which pays a constant coupon
δB , whose price is
B (t) = 1 + EQt
[ˆ t+TB
t
(δB − r (s)− (1− w)λ (s)) e−
´ s
t r(u)+λ(u)duds
]
,
(3.19)
where w is the (constant) recovery rate of the bond issuer; and
• a constant time-to-maturity (TX ) CDS written on the bond B (t, T ); the mark-to-
market value of this CDS is
X (t) = EQt
[ˆ t+TX
t
((1− w)λ (s)− δX) e−
´ s
t r(u)+λ(u)duds
]
, (3.20)
where δX is the (constant) spread which is paid periodically.
Because of the independence between r (t) and λ (t), the values of the bond and the CDS
can be simplified as follows
B (t) =δB
ˆ t+TB
t
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t r(u)du
]
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t λ(u)du
]
ds
+ w
ˆ t+TB
t
EQt
[
λ (s) e−
´ s
t λ(u)du
]
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t r(u)du
]
ds
+ EQt
[
e−
´ t+TB
t r(u)du
]
EQt
[
e−
´ t+TB
t λ(u)du
]
,
X (t) = (1− w)
ˆ t+TX
t
EQt
[
λ (s) e−
´ s
t λ(u)du
]
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t r(u)du
]
ds
− δC
ˆ t+TX
t
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t r(u)du
]
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t λ(u)du
]
ds,
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where, all the expected values can be computed in closed form as shown in Proposition
1. In this framework the bond whose price is B (t) can be considered a derivative on the
interest rate r (t) and, in the same way, the CDS whose price is X (t) can be considered
a derivative on the default intensity λ (t). Accordingly, the volatility matrix Σ (t, z) is
given by the following terms
Σ (t, z) =
[
1
B(t)
∂B(t)
∂r(t)
1
B(t)
∂B(t)
∂λ(t)
1
X(t)
∂X(t)
∂λ(t)
1
X(t)
∂X(t)
∂λ(t)
]
.
Some simple algebra allows as to conclude that the derivatives we seek can be written
as follows:
∂B (t)
∂r (t)
=− δB
ˆ t+TB
t
C
(
t; aQr , σr, s
)
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t r(u)du
]
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t λ(u)du
]
ds
− w
ˆ t+TB
t
C
(
t; aQr , σr, s
)
EQt
[
λ (s) e−
´ s
t λ(u)du
]
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t r(u)du
]
ds
− C
(
t; aQr , σr, t+ TB
)
EQt
[
e−
´ t+TB
t r(u)du
]
EQt
[
e−
´ t+TB
t λ(u)du
]
,
∂B (t)
∂λ (t)
=− δB
ˆ t+TB
t
C
(
t; aQλ , σλ, s
)
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t r(u)du
]
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t λ(u)du
]
ds
− w
ˆ t+TB
t
C
(
t; aQλ , σλ, s
)
EQt
[
λ (s) e−
´ s
t λ(u)du
]
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t r(u)du
]
ds
+ w
ˆ t+TB
t
e−
´ s
t (a
Q
λ+C(u;a
Q
λ ,σλ,s)σ
2
λ)du
ea
Q
λb
Q
λ
´ s
t C(u;a
Q
λ ,σλ,s)du+C(t;a
Q
λ ,σλ,s)λ(t)
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t r(u)du
]
ds
− C
(
t; aQλ , σλ, t+ TB
)
EQt
[
e−
´ t+TB
t r(u)du
]
EQt
[
e−
´ t+TB
t λ(u)du
]
,
∂X (t)
∂r (t)
=− (1− w)
ˆ t+TX
t
C
(
t; aQr , σr, s
)
EQt
[
λ (s) e−
´ s
t λ(u)du
]
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t r(u)du
]
ds
+ δC
ˆ t+TX
t
C
(
t; aQr , σr, s
)
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t r(u)du
]
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t λ(u)du
]
ds,
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∂X (t)
∂λ (t)
=− (1− w)
ˆ t+TX
t
C
(
t; aQλ , σλ, s
)
EQt
[
λ (s) e−
´ s
t λ(u)du
]
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t r(u)du
]
ds
+ (1− w)
ˆ t+TX
t
e−
´ s
t (a
Q
λ+C(u;a
Q
λ ,σλ,s)σ
2
λ)du
ea
Q
λb
Q
λ
´ s
t C(u;a
Q
λ ,σλ,s)du+C(t;a
Q
λ ,σλ,s)λ(t)
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t r(u)du
]
ds
+ δC
ˆ t+TX
t
C
(
t; aQλ , σλ, s
)
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t r(u)du
]
EQt
[
e−
´ s
t λ(u)du
]
ds,
where we note that the terms C (t; •, •, t+ TB) do not depend on t and, in fact,
C (t; •, •, t+ TB) = C (0; •, •, TB).
3.4.4 Calibration
In this subsection, we compute the optimal portfolio for an investor and show how it
reacts to changes in both the levels of risk aversion and underlying risk. Accordingly, we
set four scenarios, whose parameters are estimated from market data of France, Germany,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
Figure 3.1: Calibrated Path of State Variables – This figure shows the result of the calibration of the risk-free
interest rate (chart on the left) and the default intensities (chart on the right) as in eq. 3.16. The underlying
Wiener processes are independent, however for the country specific default intensities one common process
is used
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Calibrations of state variables in equation (3.16) are common to all scenarios, all the
data are collected with a daily frequency, and parameters are estimated via maximum
likelihood estimations, where ordinary least squares estimates are used as starting point
of the optimisation. To obtain default intensities parameters we first infer default intens-
ities by bootstrapping the default probability curve from listed CDS spreads as in Hull
and White (2000). We use CDS daily quotes of each country from 21 July 2008 to 31
December 2014. Riskfree interest rate parameters are obtained using the daily return on
the 3-month German Bund, from 18 November 2002 to 7 November 2011. The selected
periods reflect the longest series available from Thompson Reuters Eikon; we remove the
last 3 years from the 3-month Bund series due to negative rates. Estimates of the risk-free
interest rate parameters are reported in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Riskfree interest rate parameters estimated using the daily return of the 3-month German Bund
(from 18 November 2002 to 7 November 2011)
ar 0.3033606
br 0.0106621
σr 0.0800704
To calibrate X (t) and B (t), we assume that the CDS and defaultable bond have the
same constant maturity, equal to five years (TX = TB = 5). The constant spread (δX )
is estimated as the average of the listed 5-year CDS spreads for the selected reference
entities, while for the constant coupon of the bond (δB), we calculate the average of
coupons of fixed rate bonds of 5-year maturity issued by each selected sovereign country
from November 2002 to December 2014.4
To estimate φr and φλ, we numerically solve the following system for each country
4In order to calculate the average constant coupon, we seek 5-year fixed-rate bonds issued by the six
countries from November 2002 to December 2014.
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Et [d lnB (t)] = Mdt,Et [X(t)] = z,
where M is the estimated average return of the 5-year sovereign bond over the period
21 July 2008 to 31 December 2014 and z is the estimated price of a 5-year CDS with
recovery rate of 40% and notional value of 1. We infer CDS prices by using averages
of spreads and bootstrapped default intensities. Estimated parameters by country are
reported in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Country specific parameters estimated using daily 5-year credit default swap spreads and daily
5-year bond returns (from 21 July 2008 to 31 December 2014)
France Germany Ireland Italy Portugal Spain
aλ 0.61336 0.81642 0.83057 1.46744 0.80642 0.84172
bλ 0.02304 0.01209 0.04887 0.04623 0.06977 0.04601
σλ 0.07113 0.05665 0.15064 0.16705 0.18453 0.13337
δB 0.02895 0.0238 0.045 0.0349 0.0392 0.0368
δX 0.0081 0.0043 0.0308 0.0214 0.0424 0.02178
Et [X (t)] 0.05723 0.03237 0.12674 0.11722 0.16033 0.11613
1
dtEt [d lnB (t)] 0.01805 0.0142 0.0407 0.0338 0.0614 0.0349
φr -3.47994 -3.83582 -0.14240 -1.27866 -0.06139 -0.57855
φλ -4.65392 -7.24681 -4.50507 -4.91423 -3.48991 -4.21003
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of calibrated risk-free rates and default intensities
by country; the underlying Wiener process is common to all sovereign countries. The
period selected for the estimation of default parameters also captures the European sov-
ereign debt crisis. This can be shown in calibrated intensities: countries that have been
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affected more severely by the crisis (i.e. Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) show de-
fault intensities that are constantly above those of countries that have been affected less
seriously (i.e. France and Germany).
Base scenario
In our base scenario, we consider an investor whose preferences are described by the
following parameters:
• initial wealth R0 equal to 100;
• moderately risk adverse, with δ = 2.5;
• desired wealth at the end of the period Rm = 120;
• subjective discount rate ρ = 0.01;
• horizon of 5 years (T = 5).
Finally, we assume the recovery rate constant at w = 0.4.
Figure 3.2: Wealth Evolution in the Base Scenario – This figure shows the evolution of investor’s wealth
resulting from the optimal portfolio, in the Base Scenario, for each calibrated sovereign
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Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of the investor’s wealth for each country and Figure
3.3 shows the optimal asset allocation. The underlying sovereign risk plays a clear role:
the higher is the risk, the higher are both the average and final investor’s wealth. Less
risky countries, such as Germany and France, allow the investor to reach final wealth
that is notably lower than the wealth obtained with an investment in riskier countries. In
the same way, the underlying risk is positively correlated with the volatility of investor’s
wealth.
We stress that in most of the simulations, the portfolio shares do not show sharp
movements and, accordingly, they do not imply overly expensive transaction costs. Ac-
tually, the smooth behaviour of portfolio shares could be approximated suitably by a
piecewise function that allows keeping the portfolio unchanged for a given period of
time.
Figure 3.3: Optimal Portfolio Shares in the Base Scenario – This figure shows, for each calibrated country,
the composition of optimal portfolios in percentage terms, under the Base Scenario. The red line represents
the evolution of bond share, the green line the evolution of credit default swap share and the blue line is the
risk-free asset share
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Optimal portfolios are composed of long positions in the defaultable bonds and short
positions in the CDSs: in other words, the investor issues the CDSs to speculate on the
credit risk of the reference entity. The share of wealth invested in the bonds decreases
over time, and this reduction is compensated by an increase in the risk-free asset share.
The investment in the CDSs remains relatively stable during the 5-year period for less
risky countries, but shows a slight decrease for riskier countries. The only exception to
this behaviour is Italy, where the share of the bonds remains stable on average and the
slight increase in the risk-free asset is compensated by a small reduction in the CDSs.
Figure 3.4: Number of Contracts held in the Optimal Portfolio under the Base Scenario – This figure shows
the evolution of the number of bond and CDS contracts held in the optimal portfolio for each calibrated
country, under the Base Scenario. The blue line is the difference between CDS and bond contracts in
absolute values
The magnitude of credit risk speculation is directly linked to the sovereign risk: the
higher is the risk, the higher is the amount of credit default swaps issued by the investor.
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In addition, in this case, the only exception is the portfolio calibrated on Italian data,
which is characterised by the highest percentage of bonds and by the strongest issuance
of CDSs. This result suggests that the Italian sovereign risk measured in the financial
market is more than compensated for by the return, at least according to the risk aversion
of the representative agent we consider.
The average percentage of wealth invested in CDSs ranges during the 5-year horizon
from -3% in the case of Germany, to -75% in the case of Italy; while the percentage of
defaultable bonds ranges from an average of 60% for Germany to an average of 220%
for Italy.
Figure 3.5: Wealth Evolution in the Higher Risk Aversion Scenario – This figure shows the evolution of
investor’s wealth resulting from the optimal portfolio, when δ is set to 4.5, for each calibrated sovereign
The investment strategy as a percentage of wealth does not allow capturing the ef-
fective role of speculation. The investor significantly speculates on the credit risk of the
reference entity by issuing more CDS contracts than bonds held in the optimal portfo-
lio. Figure 3.4 shows the evolution of the number of contracts for each calibration. The
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difference, in absolute terms, between CDS and bond contracts held in the portfolio in-
creases over time; it is a minimum in the case of Germany and a maximum in the case of
Italy. The number of defaultable bonds held in the portfolios at the end of the period is
largely outweighed by the number of CDSs issued by the investor. This is also the case
at the beginning of the period, with the only exception being the German portfolio, in
which defaultable bonds overweight CDSs for the first 195 simulated days.
Figure 3.6: Optimal Portfolio Shares in the Higher Risk Aversion Scenario – This figure shows, for each
calibrated country, the composition of optimal portfolios in percentage terms, when δ is set to 4.5. The red
line represents the evolution of bond share, the green line the evolution of credit default swap share and the
blue line is the risk-free asset share
The main rationale for short selling the CDS is that it provides positive cash flows,
(coinciding with the spread δX ) that can be invested in high-return assets in order to
accumulate sufficiently high wealth over time both to face the credit risk and to obtain
a positive return. Furthermore, if the investor wants to accumulate enough wealth, the
CDSs necessarily must be overweighted with respect to the bonds.
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Higher risk aversion scenario
We recalibrate the model with δ set to 4.5 to take into account a higher degree of risk
aversion.
Figure 3.5 shows the evolution of the investor’s wealth for the six optimal portfolios:
higher risk aversion determines a lower average in the wealth growth rate but also a lower
value in its volatility.
Figure 3.7: Number of Contracts held in the Optimal Portfolio under the Higher Risk Aversion Scenario –
This figure shows the evolution of the number of bond and CDS contracts held in the optimal portfolio for
each calibrated country, when δ is set to 4.5. The blue line is the difference between CDS and bond contracts
in absolute values
As in the base scenario, the investor takes long positions in defaultable bonds and
issues CDSs, with the share invested in bonds decreasing over time and compensated for
by an increase in risk-free assets, as shown in Figure 3.6. Higher risk aversion results in
larger investment in risk-free assets and in a stronger substitution effect, particularly for
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low-risk countries. Portfolios calibrated on German and French data exhibit a decrease
in bonds and an increase in risk-free asset that are nearly linear and constant over time.
The investor speculates on credit risk by issuing more CDS contracts, on average,
than defaultable bonds purchased. The magnitude of speculation is positively correlated
with the underlying risk of the reference entity. As shown in Figure 3.7, the difference
in the number of contracts is lower than in the base scenario and initially negative for
three countries. Specifically, the initial portfolio composition includes more defaultable
bonds than CDSs for Germany, France, and Portugal and this strategy lasts for 249, 63,
and 180 days, respectively. This less aggressive behaviour of the agent reflects the higher
risk aversion.
Figure 3.8: Wealth Evolution in the Lower Target of Final Wealth Scenario – This figure shows the evolution
of investor’s wealth resulting from the optimal portfolio, when Rmis assumed to be equal to 100, for each
calibrated sovereign
Lower target of final wealth scenario
Under this scenario, we recalibrate the model with Rm = 100, which coincides with the
level of the initial wealth, that is the investor does not want to suffer any loss.
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A lower value of Rm entails higher willingness to take risks and this is reflected
in a larger level of wealth obtained at the end of the horizon. As shown in Figure 3.8,
the investor’s wealth depicts, in comparison with previous scenarios, a higher level of
volatility over the 5-year period for all countries.
Figure 3.9: Optimal Portfolio Shares in the Lower Target of Final Wealth Scenario – This figure
shows, for each calibrated country, the composition of optimal portfolios in percentage terms,
when Rmis assumed to be equal to 100. The red line represents the evolution of bond share, the
green line the evolution of credit default swap share and the blue line is the risk-free asset share
By analysing the composition of optimal portfolios (Figures 3.9 and 3.10), the evol-
ution of the investment strategy for high-risk countries is very similar to that of the base
scenario. The investor takes long positions in defaultable bonds and issues CDSs; how-
ever, for low-risk countries, two main differences arise: (i) the share of wealth invested
in bonds and CDSs at the beginning of the horizon is larger, and (ii) the overtime sub-
stitution effect between risk-free assets and bonds is nearly null. This is a consequence
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of more aggressive speculation on credit risk, which results in a notably larger difference
between issued CDSs and bonds held in the portfolio.
Figure 3.10: Number of Contracts held in the Optimal Portfolio under the Lower Target of Final Wealth
Scenario – This figure shows the evolution of the number of bond and CDS contracts held in the optimal
portfolio for each calibrated country, whenRm is assumed to be equal to 100. The blue line is the difference
between CDS and bond contracts in absolute values
Lower risk aversion scenario
In order to examine the optimal portfolio for an investor with a higher risk appetite, we
recalibrate the model with δ set to 1.5 and Rm to 100.
Figure 3.11 shows the evolution of the investor’s wealth: lower risk aversion results
in larger average values of final wealth with higher volatility. As in previous scenarios,
portfolios written on riskier countries entail a larger level of wealth for the investor than
safer countries. However, over the 5-year horizon, the volatility increases mainly for low-
risk countries: wealth obtained from the German portfolio depicts an increase in standard
deviation of 200%, while for the Portuguese portfolio, the increase is 35%.
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Figure 3.11: Wealth Evolution in the Lower Risk Aversion Scenario – This figure shows the evolution of
investor’s wealth resulting from the optimal portfolio, when δ and Rm are set respectively to 1.5 and 100,
for each calibrated sovereign
As shown in Figure 3.12, the evolution of portfolio shares is similar to other scen-
arios, with short selling of both CDSs and risk-free asset and long positions in bonds,
while speculation on credit risk is stronger, mainly for France and Germany. As depicted
in Figure 3.13, the direct link between underlying risk and magnitude of the speculation
does not seem to hold as in previous scenarios: the largest number of CDSs are issued in
German and Italian portfolios.
3.5 Conclusion
This study computes the optimal portfolio for an investor who maximises the expected
utility of his or her final wealth. The agent invests in a complete market in which a
riskless asset, a defaultable bond and a CDS written on the bond are listed.
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Figure 3.12: Optimal Portfolio Shares in the Lower Risk Aversion Scenario – This figure shows, for each
calibrated country, the composition of optimal portfolios in percentage terms, when δ and Rm are set re-
spectively to 1.5 and 100. The red line represents the evolution of bond share, the green line the evolution
of credit default swap share and the blue line is the risk-free asset share
Once a closed-form solution of the problem is found, we calibrate our model to mar-
ket data of six European countries in order to assess the behaviour of an investor exposed
to different levels of underlying risk. We find that it is always optimal to issue more CDSs
than bonds that are optimally purchased. The number of CDS contracts optimally issued
is higher for countries characterised by higher sovereign risk. This result is obtained even
when the investor is endowed with a different level of risk aversion. However, when both
risk aversion and the final wealth target are lowered, such a relationship no longer holds.
Our results suggest that when it is possible to buy CDSs in the so-called “naked”
form, financial institutions have incentives to speculate on the risk of sovereign entit-
ies. This may add support to the notion that speculation in CDSs exacerbated the recent
European sovereign crisis. Consequently, regulatory intervention would be required to
increase the effectiveness of the EU ban on uncovered CDSs.
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Figure 3.13: Number of Contracts held in the Optimal Portfolio under the Lower Risk Aversion
Scenario – This figure shows the evolution of the number of bond and CDS contracts held in the
optimal portfolio for each calibrated country, when δ and Rm are set respectively to 1.5 and 100.
The blue line is the difference between CDS and bond contracts in absolute values
The numerical application presented in this study assumes that the riskless interest
rate and the default intensity are independent. An interesting extension of this study
would be to analyse the optimal investment strategy when these two state variables are
not independent.
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Appendix 3.A Proof of proposition 1
We solve problem (3.8) following the martingale approach. Its Lagrangian function under
constraint (3.9) is:
L = Et0
[
(R (T )−Rm)1−δ
1− δ e
− ´ Tt0 ρ(u)+λ(u)du
]
+κ
(
R (t0)− Et0
[
R (T )m (t0, T ) e
− ´ Tt0 r(u)+λ(u)du
])
,
(3.21)
where the functional dependencies on z have been omitted for the sake of simplicity, κ is
the (constant) Lagrangian multiplier, and all the expected values have been written under
the historical probability. The first order condition on final wealth is
∂L
∂R (T )
= Et0
[
(R (T )−Rm)−δ e−
´ T
t0
ρ(u)+λ(u)du − κm (t0, T ) e−
´ T
t0
r(u)+λ(u)du
]
= 0,
(3.22)
and the optimal final wealth is
R∗ (T ) = Rm +
(
κm (t0, T ) e
− ´ Tt0 r(u)due
´ T
t0
ρ(u)du
)− 1
δ
. (3.23)
When the constraint is rewritten at time t (instead of t0) as follows
R (t) = Et
[
R (T )m (t, T ) e−
´ T
t r(u)+λ(u)du
]
, (3.24)
and the optimal final wealth is substituted in it, we obtain the following expression:
R (t) =
κm (t0, t) e−
´ t
t0
r(u)du
e
− ´ tt0 ρ(u)du
− 1δ F (t, z) +H (t, z) (3.25)
where
H (t, z) = EQt
[
Rme
− ´ Tt r(u)+λ(u)du
]
, (3.26)
F (t, z) = Et
[
m (t, T )1−
1
δ e−
´ T
t (
δ−1
δ
r(u)+ 1
δ
ρ(u)+λ(u))du
]
. (3.27)
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While m (t, T )1−
1
δ is not a martingale, m (t, T )1−
1
δ e
1
2
1
δ
δ−1
δ
´ T
t ξ(s)
′ξ(s)ds is:(
m (t, T )1−
1
δ e
1
2
1
δ
δ−1
δ
´ T
t ξ(s)
′ξ(s)ds
)−1
d
(
m (t, T )1−
1
δ e
1
2
1
δ
δ−1
δ
´ T
t ξ(s)
′ξ(s)ds
)
= −δ − 1
δ
ξ (T ) dW (T ) .
(3.28)
Accordingly, we define the new probability
dW (t)Qδ =
δ − 1
δ
ξ (t) dt+ dW (t) , (3.29)
and write
F (t) = EQδt
[
e−
´ T
t (
δ−1
δ
r(u,z)+ 1
δ
ρ(u,z)+λ(u,z)+ 1
2
1
δ
δ−1
δ
ξ(u,z)′ξ(u,z))du
]
. (3.30)
The differential of (3.25), through Ito’s lemma, is (the drift term is neglected since it
is immaterial to replication):
dR (t) = (...) dt+
1
δ
(
κm (t0, t) e
− ´ tt0 r(u)due
´ t
t0
ρ(u)du
)− 1
δ
F (t, z) ξ (t, z)′ dW (t)
+
(
κm (t0, t) e
− ´ tt0 r(u)due
´ t
t0
ρ(u)du
)− 1
δ
Fz (t, z)
′Ω (t, z)′ dW (t)
+Hz (t, z)
′Ω (t, z)′ dW (t) , (3.31)
where the subscripts on F (t, z) and H (t, z) indicate partial derivatives. Once the fol-
lowing relationship
R (t)−H (t, z)
F (t, z)
=
(
κm (t0, t) e
− ´ tt0 r(u,z)due
´ t
t0
ρ(u,z)du
)− 1
δ
, (3.32)
is suitably taken into account, the differential equation becomes
dR (t) = (...) dt+
(
R (t)−H (t, z)
δ
ξ (t, z)′ +
R (t)−H (t, z)
F (t, z)
Fz (t, z)
′ Ω (t, z)′ +Hz (t, z)
′ Ω (t, z)′
)
dW (t) .
(3.33)
When Σ (t, z) ISθS (t) is set equal to the diffusion term of (3.33), the optimal port-
folio in Proposition 1 is found.
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Appendix 3.B Computation of V (t, T )
If the stochastic variable y (t) follows the process
dy (t) = a (b− y (t)) dt+ σ
√
y (t)dW (t) ,
y (t0) = y0,
then the expected value
V (t, T ) = Et
[
(1− χ+ χy (T )) e−
´ T
t y(s)ds
]
,
must solve the partial differential equation
∂V
∂t
+
∂V
∂y
a (b− y) + 1
2
∂2V
∂y2
σ2y = yV,
with the boundary condition
V (T, T ) = 1− χ+ χy (T ) ,
where the parameter χ can take either value 1 or value 0. Now we use the guess function
V (t, y) = (E (t) + F (t) y) e−A(t)−C(t)y,
where the function A, C, E, and F must be computed in order to solve the previous
differential equation. The boundary condition translates into the following conditions:
E (T ) = 1− χ,
F (T ) = χ,
A (T ) = 0,
C (T ) = 0.
Once the partial derivatives of V are substituted into the differential equation we
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obtain5
0 =
(
∂E
∂t
+
∂F
∂t
y
)
+ (E + Fy)
(
−∂A
∂t
− ∂C
∂t
y
)
+ (F − (E + Fy)C) a (b− y)
+
1
2
(−2CF + (E + Fy)C2)σ2y − y (E + Fy) ,
which is an ordinary differential equation in A, C, E, and F . Since this equation must
hold for any value of y then we can split it into three ordinary differential equations as
follows 
0 = ∂E∂t + Fab− E (At + Cab) ,
0 = ∂F∂t − F (At + Cab)− Fa− CFσ2,
0 = −∂C∂t + aC + 12C2σ2 − 1.
(3.34)
We immediately see that the value of function C (t) can be computed from the third
equation. With the suitable boundary condition the only solution of the differential equa-
tion for C (t) is given by
C (t) = 2
1− e−
√
a2+2σ2(T−t)
√
a2 + 2σ2 + a+
(√
a2 + 2σ2 − a
)
e−
√
a2+2σ2(T−t)
.
The values of all the other functions can be written as functions of C (t). Now, if we
wanted to compute just the probability to be solvable, then we would have E = 1 and
F = 0 with the function A accordingly solving
0 =
∂A
∂t
+ Cab,
with the boundary condition A (T ) = 0. The only solution of this equation is
A (t) = ab
ˆ T
t
C (s) ds.
5For the sake of simplicity, we have omitted the functional dependencies.
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Given this value for A (t), the two first equations of system (3.34) become
0 =
∂E (t)
∂t
+ F (t) ab,
0 =
∂F (t)
∂t
− F (t) (a+ C (t)σ2) .
We now compute the value of F from the second equation by obtaining
F (t) = χe−
´ T
t (a+C(s)σ
2)ds,
and the value of E can then be computed from the first equation
E (t) = 1− χ+ ab
ˆ T
t
F (s) ds.
Finally, we can write
V (t, T ) =
(
1− χ+ χab
ˆ T
t
e−
´ T
s (a+C(u)σ
2)duds+ χe−
´ T
t (a+C(u)σ
2)duy (t)
)
× e−ab
´ T
t C(u)du−C(t)y(t).
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